Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that West Germany has bowed to pressure from President Nasser of Egypt and canceled armed shipments to Israel. In taking this action, Bonn has surrendered to Nasser's blackmail at the expense of Israel's security.

West Germany's surrender to Nasser's blackmail threat to recognize East Germany if Bonn did not halt aid to Israel, can be interpreted as another victory for Nasser and the Soviet Union. Pressured and influenced by the Soviet, Nasser has long demanded an end to West Germany's arms shipments to Israel. He was not successful until he seized on the bold idea of inviting East Germany's President Ulbricht to Egypt for a state visit—a gamble for Nasser since his country desperately needs new loans from the West. Nasser stood to lose more than the West, and yet he won.

Mr. Speaker, last week I voted against further aid from our country to Egypt as long as Nasser continues to push his aggressive policies in the Middle East. I said:

> Let us give Nasser the opportunity to convince us that he and his nation deserve our generosity. The time has come to place upon him the burden of proving to our satisfaction that he is worthy of our aid.

Only a matter of a few days later, Nasser threatens Bonn with recognition of East Germany, and instead of halting aid to Egypt, West Germany halts military aid to Israel. It is additionally embarrassing to us that the Prime Minister of Egypt gloatingly first made the announcement to the world that West Germany would terminate the shipments to Israel.

Mr. Speaker, our American position in the Middle East is weakened, Israel's position is weakened, and West German relations with Israel, which had improved so much, have dived to a dangerous level of anger and bitterness; while the power and prestige of Nasser and Communist East Germany are strengthened and the Soviet Union continues arms shipments to the United Arab Republic.

The action in the past few days proves we cannot trust Nasser; a dictator is a dictator no matter how we look at it, and Nasser is an aggressive dictator. All the appeasement in the world will not keep under control his insatiable hunger for more power.

ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL

(Mr. ADDABBO (at the request of Mr. GILBERT) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues in urging the Bonn Government to reconsider its termination of its contract to ship helicopters and tanks to Israel. I do not believe that any nation should compromise its legal obligations and contracts because of threats by a third nation. If the Bonn Government is to stand as a free nation, it must show its willingness to be bound by its legal commitments and not waiver to a side where the greatest force might be applied.

FRANCE WANTS U.S. GOLD; SHOULD PAY DEBTS TO UNITED STATES

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville is visiting the United States. While he is here the Government of France should be firmly reminded that it still owes the United States billions of dollars in debts for World War I.

The terms for France's repayment of its World War I debts to the United States were approved by the 69th Congress and enacted into law in 1929. The debt was to be paid by June 15, 1987. However, because France was in such financial difficulty in the early 1930's, the Congress allowed a period of grace for France's payments on the war debt. The grace period was to run from fiscal year 1932 for a 10-year period, but of course the end of that grace period saw France right in the middle of World War II, so the American people did not press for payment of the World War I debts.

However, now that France is financially secure, General de Gaulle has announced his intention to convert U.S. dollars to gold. He has already received $150 million in U.S. gold, and the French Republic now states it will continue to demand gold as U.S. dollars flow into its coffers.

This demand comes at a time when the United States is showing increasing concern over its dwindling gold reserves. One reason for the gold outflow is the large number of U.S. tourists which go overseas, many of them visiting France and bringing prosperity in that country as well as U.S. dollars for the French Treasury to convert to U.S. gold.

I am today introducing a resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that France begin repayments on its World War I debts. The last payment was made June 15, 1931, and it amounted to $40 million. The amount of the debts came to over $6.5 billion, and since no payment has been made for 34 years sound business practice dictates that payment be resumed. My resolution would request that the French debt be paid off according to the original scheduled date of 1987. The United States would accept U.S. dollars from France in payment—or gold would do.

WEST GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday, in the course of making a 1-minute statement, I said that I was shocked to learn that West Germany had canceled its agreement to deliver arms to Israel. I said some other unpleasant things about that nation because I thought there was good reason therefor.

I repeat and reiterate all the statements I made which are contained in today's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD; and now suggest that not alone has the Bonn government been finding it difficult to cleanse itself of the stench of Auschwitz, but it has been thoroughly outwitted by Nasser; and has also lost face and prestige in this country and even some commercial business from American business firms. I understand several contracts for the purchase from Germany of machinery have been canceled in the wake of the Bonn government's severing its agreement to furnish arms to Israel.

I have said on this floor, you cannot appease a Hitler. I venture to say Ulbricht will go to Cairo anyway and will be well received by Nasser which, in effect, will amount to de facto recognition. Where does this leave Germany except in an "incredible mess" as stated in the New York Times of yesterday.

The action by the Bonn government in failing to honor its agreement with Israel and in collapsing at the first sign of trouble is a victory for Moscow diplomacy because it weakens Israel, strengthens East Germany, and bolsters Egypt. Surely at this indication of weakness on the part of the Bonn government Nasser will feel free to make other threats and who can guarantee that the weakening German backbone will not again yield to what may well be bluff and bluster.

The new Germany has been trying to persuade the world that it has reformed—the present actions of the Bonn government are not a shining example of such reform. One wonders how far the Nazi beliefs are actually buried.

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTS

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Accounts of the Committee on House Administration may be permitted to sit during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Maryland?

There was no objection.

OUR COURSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Mr. COLLIER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, recently we have witnessed demonstrations on college campuses protesting our retaliatory actions in the Vietnam conflict.

In other quarters there has been public criticism of our policy in handling the crisis in southeast Asia.

While I respect freedom of expression of every American, I think these attacks at this time are sad and regrettable—particularly since they are used in propaganda that aids and abets the enemy. Any course other than the one we are

taking under the conditions which prevail would be a grave mistake.

The defense of freedom and commitments always involves calculated risks, but I shudder to think of the consequences if we turned our other cheek to the arrogant Communist aggressor who has no intention of stopping here. Permitted to seize Vietnam, where would they stop next—Thailand, Malaysia, or who knows where?

Now is the time all Americans should unite in support of the President's policy in the southeast Asian crisis for we can do no less under the circumstances which prevail in fulfilling our treaty commitment and moral obligation to the free world and to our own national security.

CORRECTION OF THE RECORD

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to make a correction in a statement which I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on February 15, 1965. The vote count mentioned in column 1, line 7, page A607, should read "yeas, 165; nays, 241."

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

EXCISE TAX REDUCTION

(Mr. MINSHALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Speaker, while awaiting the administration's decision on excise tax reduction, I am studying the excise tax section of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. It is riddled with wartime-imposed emergency revenue-raising methods, "temporary" taxes in effect now for a generation. These taxes, imposed originally to support the war effort, have become crutches in supporting bigger and bigger Federal budgets.

Among those I feel should be eliminated are excise taxes on club dues, initiation fees, and lifetime memberships. In legislation I am introducing today I ask repeal of these taxes, just as I have asked repeal of the telephone-telegraph tax and the entertainment tax in bills introduced earlier this session. Millions of American men and women are penalized for their memberships in service, patriotic, and civic organizations which do boundless good for their communities and Nation. At a time when recreation is considered important enough for the Federal Government to subsidize costly programs in this area, and to spend taxpayers' money promoting national physical fitness, I see no reason why dues and fees for country clubs and athletic clubs should be subject to taxation.

I am hopeful that the Ways and Means Committee will give this bill its serious consideration when the general subject of excise tax repeal comes before them.

AID TO NASSER

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I am sorry that the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. CELLER] has left the House floor.

Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. There he is.

Mr. GROSS. I am glad to see him here because I was unable to ascertain when he spoke earlier this afternoon on the business of giving food products to Dictator Nasser whether he regretted the flexible vote he cast in favor of that business.

Mr. CELLER. Does the gentleman want me to answer?

Mr. GROSS. Yes, I would be glad to have an answer.

Mr. CELLER. I do not regret that vote because that first vote where I and others indicated that no aid should be given might be deemed very rigid notice and very powerful notice that there might be revision of policy. However, after the occurrences in Vietnam I felt, and others did likewise, that this was a time of emergency and that we should stand foursquare behind our President in the formulation of foreign policy.

Mr. GROSS. Well, Mr. Speaker, before my time runs out, that sounds exactly like the answer we got from the State Department in the Committee on Foreign Affairs this morning when we tried to ascertain where they are going from here with respect to Nasser. The gentleman's answer sounds exactly the same.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. DEVINE. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 15]

Abbitt	Foley	Nix
Adair	Giaimo	O'Brien
Ashley	Gonzalez	O'Neal, Ga.
Aspinall	Gray	Pelly
Baldwin	Gubser	Powell
Baring	Hagen, Calif.	Quillen
Battin	Hanna	Reid, N.Y.
Bell	Hansen, Idaho	Reinecke
Betts	Hardy	Rhodes, Ariz.
Blatnik	Harvey, Mich.	Rivers, Alaska
Bolling	Holland	Rivers, S.C.
Bolton	Hosmer	Roosevelt
Brooks	Jacobs	Rostenkowski
Brown, Calif.	Johnson, Calif.	Roudebush
Broyhill, Va.	Jones, Ala.	Sisk
Burton, Utah	Kastenmeier	Springer
Cabell	King, Calif.	Staggers
Cameron	King, N.Y.	Teague, Tex.
Cederberg	Kluczynski	Thompson, N.J.
Clawson, Del	Long, La.	Toll
Colmer	Love	Tuck
Conyers	McDowell	Tunney
Corman	McMillan	Udall
Cramer	Macdonald	Utt
Curtin	Martin, Mass.	Walker, Miss.
Derwinski	Miller	White, Idaho
Duncan, Oreg.	Moorhead	Wilson,
Erlenborn	Morse	Charles H.
Farnsley	Murray	Wright

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 347 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

NASSER'S NEW TURMOIL

(Mr. HALPERN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I join in expressing my own personal indignation and shock at the success registered by bluster and blackmail on the international scene. Nasser has succeeded in wringing from the West German Government a termination of aid to a friendly power.

Truly these ignoble events have plunged diplomacy to new depths of ugliness.

Nasser is about to receive for an official visit the most hated Communist boss in Europe. The Hallstein doctrine, totally unrealistic, is in substance responsible for West Germany's ill-advised decision to abruptly terminate aid to Israel; Nasser forced Bonn to take this step, a hasty and irresponsible act.

There is no end to the turmoil this man will cause unless he is faced with people of equal will and determination. It is lamentable that the Congress did not finally accept a complete termination of our aid program to Egypt.

Nasser has an obsession against the Western democracies; he will spare no effort to subvert their objectives and raise havoc amongst them.

And now West Germany. The Bonn Government has suffered a needless loss of face, a tangible diplomatic defeat. In sabotaging the slow and welcome progress toward a normalization of German-Israel relations, it has received nothing in return; and the consequences of its irresponsibility will be felt for a long time to come.

Nasser must be curbed. His policy is an utter contradiction of American foreign policy objectives. Now he has acted to weaken the necessary strength which Israel must possess as a partner of peace and democratic ideals.

I condemn the diplomatic blackmail by this man who, by his words and deeds, is helping to destroy that base of international morality and decency for which this Nation strives.

HORTON BILL INCREASES SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced legislation in Congress today to give 20 million social security beneficiaries a 7-percent increase in monthly payments. The bill is based on a measure passed by both the House and Senate in the last Congress, but which died in conference because of disagreement over the Senate addition of a health care benefits amendment.

The 89th Congress should here and now redeem the wrong done last year to retired workers, widows, orphans, and

H.J. RES. 327

Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the election of the President and Vice President

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, be elected as follows:

"Each State shall be entitled to cast for President and Vice President a number of electoral votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress. Such electoral votes shall be cast, as provided by section 2 of this article, upon the basis of an election in which the people of such State shall cast their votes for candidates to the offices of President and Vice President. The voters in each State in any such election shall have the qualifications requisite for persons voting for members of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

"The Congress shall determine the time of such election. Unless otherwise determined by the Congress, such election shall be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the regular term of office of the President is to begin.

"SEC. 2. In such election within any State, the voters by a single ballot shall cast their votes for candidates to the offices of President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The name of any person may be placed upon any ballot listing candidates for the offices of President and Vice President only with the consent of such person; but no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to the office of Vice President. The electoral votes which each State is entitled to cast shall be cast for the person who in that State receives the greatest number of votes for President and Vice President, respectively.

"Within forty-five days after the election, or at such time as the Congress shall direct, the official custodian of the election returns of each State shall prepare, sign, certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate, a list of all persons for whom votes were cast for President and a separate list of all persons for whom votes were cast for Vice President. Upon each list there shall be entered the number of votes cast for each person thereon, the total number of votes cast for all such persons, and the name of the person for whom the electoral votes of such State are cast.

"SEC. 3. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of electoral votes for President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State. Such votes shall be in addition to those to which the States are entitled but shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of the President and Vice President, to be votes cast by a State.

"The election within the District for President and Vice President shall be held as provided in sections 1 and 2 of this article, and the District shall cast the electoral votes in the manner as provided in section 2 of this article.

"The Congress shall have the power to enforce this section by appropriate legislation.

"SEC. 4. On the sixth day of January following the election, unless the Congress by law appoints a different day not earlier than the fourth day of January and not later than the tenth day of January, the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, open all the election certificates and the electoral votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of electoral votes for President shall be the President, and the person having the greatest number of electoral votes for Vice President shall be Vice President.

"If the count of the electoral votes shall result in a tie, with any candidates to the office of President or Vice President, respectively, having an equal number of electoral votes otherwise sufficient for election to the office to which they are a candidate, then from those candidates with such equal number of votes the Senate and the House of Representatives, sitting in joint session, shall choose immediately the person to fill such office. The vote of each Member of each House shall be publicly announced and recorded. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of three-quarters of the whole number of Senators and Representatives, and the candidates for either such office receiving the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected.

"SEC. 5. If, at the time fixed for the counting of the electoral votes as provided in section 4 of this article, the presidential candidate who would have received the greatest number of electoral votes for President shall have died, the vice-presidential candidate who is entitled to receive the greatest number of electoral votes for Vice President shall become President.

"SEC. 6. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of both the presidential and vice-presidential candidates who, except for their death, would have been entitled to receive the greatest number of electoral votes for President and Vice President, respectively, and for the case of the death of any candidates from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose a President or a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

"SEC. 7. The first, second, third, and fourth paragraphs of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of amendment to the Constitution, sections 3 and 4 of the twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution, and the twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution, are hereby repealed.

"SEC. 8. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress."

SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

(Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, the situation in Vietnam has reached crisis proportions. The conflict in that war-torn area of the world has escalated dangerously, while changes in the government of South Vietnam continue without any apparent sign that an end is in sight.

The Vietnamese crisis has its roots deep in the past, but this is not the time to deplore what is past, but to decide what is to be done about the present and the future.

I think it is clear that a peaceable setlement must be sought through international conference. I have asked President Johnson to immediately take the initiative to start negotiations toward this end.

I have also asked the President to give the people of the United States a clear definition of our policy in southeast Asia, to give some precise answers to the questions that have too long gone unanswered, with a resulting confusion in the public mind.

The following letter, which I sent to President Johnson, reflects not only the concern of my colleagues and me, but that of all Americans and the other peoples of the free world:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., February 12, 1965.

HON. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON: I am taking the liberty of writing to express my concern and that of many of my constituents about the escalation of our activities in Vietnam.

To many of us, the stand we have taken in Vietnam appears to be at the wrong time, at the wrong place, and for the wrong cause. To take the ultimate risks of involvement with China and possibly of a nuclear holocaust to defend people who have no desire for our assistance and who are undergoing an apparently internal revolution, seems mistaken to us. While we would be perfectly willing to take these ultimate risks to preserve our freedom or even more remotely to preserve the cause of freedom in the world, that does not seem to be the case with the Vietnamese situation.

We are all very aware of our limitations in advising on foreign policy matters. Just last week I voted against restricting your authority to send food to Egypt even though my feelings are strongly against giving any aid to the United Arab Republic at this time, because I appreciate congressional limitations on acting competently in this field.

To have the wholehearted backing of the people, the people should be informed and to have the wholehearted backing of Congress, we too should be informed of the underlying rational of so important a policy, even if the details of the conduct of our conflict cannot, for security reasons, be made public.

From my present knowledge, I would strongly advise that we immediately take the initiative to commence negotiations under the auspices of the U.N. or another international body to try to reestablish a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. This seems vital to avoid nuclear catastrophe. Our present policy seems doomed to failure and daily we increase resentment against our actions by Asians, many of whom feel that our intervention is a form of imperialism.

If such negotiations are for some reason unfeasible, then I think we and the public should be informed as to why they are unfeasible.

I would urge that open public hearings be held by the Congress at which the various administration officials involved would explain the basis for our continued prosecution of this conflict and our policy with respect to it. In the alternative, you might make this explanation yourself to the public.

Our lives, those of our children, and perhaps even the future of the world, are at stake with such momentous decisions in-

volved and still with time to take alternative actions, though not much time, I hope you will give serious consideration to these recommendations.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

RICHARD L. OTTINGER.

JOINT CIVIC COMMITTEE OF THE ITALIAN AMERICANS IN CHICAGO, ILL.

(Mr. ANNUNZIO (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I have for many years had the honor of being closely associated with the Joint Civic Committee of the Italian Americans in Chicago, Ill.

Representing over 40 different organizations, the joint civic committee serves as both planner and coordinator of numerous civic, educational, welfare, and social action programs carried out by the Italo-American community in the greater Chicago area.

We in Chicago are proud of the joint civic committee's accomplishments and of the local, State, and National acclaim its work has earned. Community leaders across the country have acquainted themselves with the joint civic committee and have used it as a model for similar enterprises.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I include excerpts from the annual report for 1964 of the Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans for Chicago. The report follows:

The work of the Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans was broadened and intensified on a truly impressive basis during 1964 under the leadership of Anthony Paterno, president. It is doubtful that any previous year was so fruitful and rewarding. Not only did the committee have a significant impact upon our people in the Chicago metropolitan area, but in addition, Americans of Italian extraction in many other States became cognizant of our work and accomplishments.

The Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans is known all over Illinois and from New York to California President Johnson, Governor Kerner, Mayor Daley, and many of the U.S. Senators and Congressmen are intimately acquainted with our program and with our goals and aspirations. We in Chicago can be proud of the many activities which are carried on by the Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans. Without question, the Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans has blazed new trails in civic action. The work of the joint civic committee is carried on under the leadership of dedicated volunteers working on various subcommittees which will be discussed briefly in this report.

At long last, on November 1, 1964, the joint civic committee opened an office, employed a full-time secretary and other personnel so that these activities could be carried on more effectively and efficiently and thus better meet the needs of our people in general.

To raise the necessary funds for this expanded program, the joint civic committee will cosponsor an opera, "Aida" in conjunction with the Apollo Opera Co. at the Civic Opera House on February 20, 1965. Cochairmen of this event are Congressman FRANK ANNUNZIO, Anthony Paterno, Nello Ferrara, Dr. Mario O. Rubinelli, and Victor Failla.

Increasingly in this country we are beginning to appreciate and to value all things Italian. This appreciation, we believe, was best expressed some years ago by an eminent American, often quoted by Victor Arrigo. We refer to President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University when he said, "The place of Italy in civilization is best shown by trying to subtract that place from world history. Take away her scientific accomplishments, her statesmanship, her leadership of the world for many years, and what have you left? The world looks badly decapitated. You can subtract Italian culture from civilization only by destroying that civilization."

HUMAN RELATIONS

At the beginning of the year the joint civic committee started with a determination to deal more vigorously and more effectively with human relation problems affecting the Italian people. A strong policy, adopted by the executive committee, and implemented by the human relations committee directed by Joseph Barbera, vowed that hereafter all incidents involving discrimination or defamation of character would be given top priority with immediate action to be taken.

During the year the human relations committee investigated approximately six incidents involving discrimination. The major incident concerned two attorneys of Italian extraction who were rejected for appointment as circuit court magistrates. A thorough investigation by the human relations committee revealed clearly that the two attorneys had no negative marks in their record either as private citizens or attorneys. The human relations committee will continue to be alert in the coming year to any unfair attacks made upon persons of Italian extraction.

COLUMBUS DAY PARADE

As we all know, one of the turning points in history was the discovery of America by Columbus, an Italian. Columbus, therefore, has become our symbol, our inspiration, and our hope for a better world. For this reason, also we are pressing the fight to have Columbus Day observed as a national legal holiday.

Under the leadership of Frank Armanetti, general chairman, this year's parade was one of the most colorful parades ever to march down State Street. The 50 floats were superbly designed and decorated, the bands and marchers and other units—a total of 200—all gave excellent performances, hailed and praised by everyone.

Two million people saw the parade, both on State Street and on television. Hon. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Governor Kerner, Mayor Daley, Senator DOUGLAS, Senator DIRKSEN, Congressman ANNUNZIO, and all of our Illinois political leaders marched in the parade and viewed it from the special stand on Madison and State Streets.

CULTURAL AFFAIRS

The highly successful program, "Sojourn in Italy" sponsored by the Joint Civic Committee of Italian Americans was offered for the third year at DePaul University, 25 East Jackson Boulevard.

The program continued to attract hundreds of persons who wish to learn the Italian language and become better acquainted with its history, art, literature, science, music—in short—its whole way of life.

Under the leadership of Peter R. Scalise, chairman of the committee, this program costs about $10,000 a year and is largely subsidized by the nominal tuition of $20 for 30 sessions and by contributions from sponsors.

Another activity of the cultural affairs committee was the sponsorship of a lecture and exhibit on Galileo at the art institute to focus attention on the 400th anniversary of the famous Italian scientist.

Another accomplishment in cultural affairs was the joint civic committee's efforts in having the Postmaster General issue a special commemorative postage stamp on Dante. Originally proposed by Prof. Joseph Fucilla, of Northwestern University, this idea was presented to Senator PAUL DOUGLAS who secured approval for the Dante stamp. It will be issued early in 1965.

IMMIGRATION RALLY AND LEGISLATION

The joint civic committee cosponsored a gigantic immigration rally on December 15, 1963 in conjunction with the Chicago chapter, American Committee on Italian Migration. Held at the McCormick Place and attended by 5,000 persons, this highly successfully rally helped to focus attention on the need to change the formula for the national origins quota which greatly restricts immigration from Italy.

At a followup meeting on March 31, 1964, at the Sherman House, delegates from over 40 organizations took responsibility for circulating petitions to obtain names of thousands of supporters for submission to President Johnson and to the Senators and Congressmen.

REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

For a number of years the joint civic committee has been carrying on a campaign to have persons of Italian extraction appointed to the various advisory boards and commissions of city, country, and State governments.

Conferences were held with Mayor Daley and Governor Kerner and they indicated an interest and willingness to appoint persons of Italian origin to the various boards.

ITALIAN FLOOD RELIEF

A check for $25,000 was presented on October 30, 1964, by the Italian Flood Relief Committee to aid the victims of last year's Valont Dam disaster which killed over 2,000 persons in Longarone, Italy.

SCHOLARSHIP FUND

A scholarship fund, which began about 8 years ago, was resumed in 1964. Participating in a benefit luncheon with the United Chicago Police Association enabled us to raise sufficient funds.

Known as the Rocky Marciano Scholarship Fund, the committee in 1964 made the fund available to the Sacred Heart Seminary enabling two of its graduates to attend the Maryknoll College Seminary.

CALVARY HILL "PASSION PLAY"

An "Italian night" was sponsored by the joint civic committee at the Sacred Heart Seminary in Stone Park on Saturday, August 14, 1964.

The major attraction was the Calvary Hill "Passion Play" conducted by the Scalabrini Fathers which was attended by 7,000 people, a record attendance for one night.

FLIGHTS TO ITALY

In order to facilitate travel to Italy at a low cost, group basis, from Chicago to Rome, the Joint Civic Committee of Italian-Americans in 1964 sponsored its second annual program.

Five flights by Alitalia jet planes were sponsored for members, spouses, and dependents at group rates of $477. Flights started in June and continued to September 1964. Each group consisted of 25 or more pasengers and the stay in Italy ranged from 3 to 6 weeks. To be eligible persons had to have membership in the joint civic committee or in one of its affiliated organizations which have coextensive membership in the committee. A total of 150 persons participated in this unique travel program which afforded a wonderful opportunity to visit relatives and to see firsthand the beauty and marvels of Italy.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

In addition to the major projects described in this report, the joint civic committee

marks of the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], I have some extended remarks to make on the same problem. I should appreciate the opportunity to go into that subject tonight. I hope that helps in resolving the uncertainty in the mind of the acting majority leader.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I had inquired as to the possibility of a unanimous-consent agreement. Under the circumstances, it is not possible. It would be objected to. That being the case, I have discussed the situation with the distinguished chairman of the committee, the junior Senator from Virginia. His judgment is that the Senate would do better if it were to come back tomorrow and seek to finish consideration of the bill then.

Mr. ROBERTSON. I am sure that many Senators have engagements and will not be here after 6:30, and I do not see why we should proceed if we could not obtain a quorum.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Under the circumstances I think it would be better to resume consideration of the bill tomorrow and seek to complete action then. I would hope that tomorrow we would be able to finish action on this bill and the other bills which have been referred to, but I do not believe there is too much hope for that.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, does the acting majority leader know how many amendments there are?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. There would be a vote on two more amendments and perhaps a vote on passage of the bill. While my heart is with the Senator from Florida, I believe he would find that absenteeism would be so pronounced after 7 o'clock that it would be necessary to come back and complete action on the bill tomorrow.

I hope there would be no objection to modifying the unanimous consent previously entered, in order that action on the bill could be finished tomorrow.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, one more inquiry. I understand an order was obtained for the Senate to meet at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

HEARINGS BY THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY ON U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, the chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency announced that he was starting hearings next week, or soon thereafter, on the question of balance of payments. In order to assist the committee and Members of this body in studying that question, I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed the titles, page references, and years of issue of some 16 studies issued by the Joint Economic Committee. We shall be glad to get these publications to the chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency for such use as he may wish to make of them. They weigh, in all, about 8 pounds; and I feel that they will help the Committee on Banking and Currency in the hearings that may conducted.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE PUBLICATIONS ON THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

"International Influences on the American Economy," June 1959.

"International Effects of U.S. Economic Policy," by Edward M. Bernstein, January 1960.

"International Payments Imbalances and Need for Strengthening International Financial Arrangements"; hearings before Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, May, June, 1961.

"International Payments Imbalances and Need for Strengthening International Financial Arrangements"; report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, August 1961.

"Factors Affecting the U.S. Balance of Payments"; studies prepared for the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, December 1962.

"Outlook for the U.S. Balance of Payments"; hearings before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, December 1962.

"U.S. Payments Policies Consistent with Domestic Objectives of Maximum Employment and Growth"; report of the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, December 1962.

"Current Problems and Policies," July 1963; hearings on the U.S. balance of payments, part 1.

"Outlook for the U.S. Balance of Payments"; hearings on the U.S. balance of payments, part 2, July 1963.

"The International Monetary System: Functioning and Possible Reform"; hearings on the U.S. balance of payments, part 3, November 1963.

"The U.S. Balance of Payments—Perspectives and Policies," November 1963.

"The U.S. Balance of Payments: Statements by Economists, Bankers, and Others on the Brookings Institution Study, 'The U.S. Balance of Payments in 1968.'" November 1963.

"A Description and Analysis of Certain Euroepan Capital Markets," January 1964.

"The U.S. Balance of Payments," March 1964.

"Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments"; part IV, hearings, March 1964.

"Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments"; hearings, part V, appendix, September 1964.

EXECUTIVE BUSINESS

As in executive session,

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I have conferred with the minority leader and with the minority members of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on this request. I ask unanimous consent, as in executive session, to report from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service the nomination of John A. Gronouski, of Wisconsin, to be Postmaster General, and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed as in executive session.

If there be no committee reports, the nomination will be stated.

POSTMASTER GENERAL

The legislative clerk read the nomination of John A. Gronouski, of Wisconsin, to be Postmaster General.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the nomination

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the nomination.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the committee unanimously reported favorably the confirmation of the nomination of Postmaster General. We are taking this unusual action since the term of the Postmaster would automatically expire on Friday. In order to have continuity of contracts and other important business, it is necessary that we act now, so the confirmation can reach the White House in time for the Postmaster General to be installed in office at the expiration of his present term.

On behalf of the chairman of the full Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], I should like to read this statement, as the Senator from South Carolina is unable to be present:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR OLIN D. JOHNSTON ON THE NOMINATION OF MR. JOHN A. GRONOUSKI TO BE POSTMASTER GENERAL, FEBRUARY 17, 1965

I am very pleased that President Johnson has reappointed John Gronouski to be Postmaster General. I wish it were possible for me to be in the Senate to vote for his confirmation.

He has served as Postmaster General ably and well since his appointment in 1963, demonstrating an unusual ability to attack problems head on and frequently to find solutions. He has brought to his position the talents of a scholar and the energies and directness of an outstanding administrator.

As chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, I have dealt for many years with the complicated web of postal affairs, and I feel that we are indeed fortunate to have a man of John Gronouski's demonstrated abilities to seek solutions to our postal problems. My relations with the Postmaster General have always been marked by great cordiality and cooperation on his part, and I look forward to their continuation.

John Gronouski has my every good wish as his new term of office begins.

I have just read a statement by the distinguished chairman of the committee, who is absent because of illness. Republicans as well as Democrats spoke glowingly of the services Mr. Gronouski has rendered during the time he has been Postmaster General since his appointment in 1963.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I concur in everything the Senator from Oklahoma has said. I believe Postmaster General Gronouski is making a magnificent record. He has performed his tasks far beyond the call of duty. I say this as one who has had an opportunity to know the extent to which he has gone in traveling about the country fulfilling his responsibilities and duties. I believe he is entitled to the highest commendation we can give him. I am extremely honored to support the nomination.

Mr. MONRONEY. I appreciate what the Senator from Louisiana has said. During the service of the Postmaster General he has visited in practically all the 50 States, where his farflung enterprise is situated. He has seen many of the men whose task it is to move the millions of pieces of mail and who comprise the postal service.

I ask for a vote on the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is, Will the Senate advise and consent to the confirmation of this nomination?

The nomination was confirmed.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask that the President be notified immediately of the confirmation of the nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the President will be immediately notified.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

OUR OVERINVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND ASIA—A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EX-COLONIAL REGIONS OF THE WORLD

PART I: FROM ONE EXTREME TO ANOTHER

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, "we can never again stand aside prideful in isolation," so spoke Lyndon B. Johnson at his inauguration.

All Americans should agree with the President. Head-in-the-sand isolationism died a generation ago. It isn't likely to be resurrected. The ranks of those who believe that the United States can ever again withdraw from world affairs have been rightly decimated.

As a confirmed internationalist, I favor strong American support for the United Nations. I believe in a sensible foreign aid program to help lift depressed living standards in the underdeveloped world. In the Senate, I have voted consistently to extend the use of our surplus food in hungry lands, and to enlarge the Peace Corps as living work-a-day evidence of American good will.

But the pendulum of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other. Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our business; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business. In the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has been transformed into an excess of interventionism.

Since the days of the Marshall plan, the United States has constantly expanded the scope of its commitment to foreign governments. From Western Europe, we have moved into Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, until the dimension of our involvement has become global. Our troops are now stationed in no less than 30 countries, we are pledged to defend 42, and we are extending aid, in one form or another, to nearly 100 nations. As a result of this proliferation, Walter Lippmann writes:

> We have become grossly overextended in regions where we have no primary vital interest. We have scattered our assistance to such a degree that we help everybody a little and nobody enough.

Why have we spread ourselves so thin? What compulsion draws us, ever deeper, into the internal affairs of so many countries in Africa and Asia, having so remote a connection with the vital interests of the United States?

The answer, I think, stems from our intensely ideological view of the cold war. We have come to treat "communism," regardless of what form it may take in any given country, as the enemy. We fancy ourselves as guardian of the "free" world, though most of it is not free, and never has been. We seek to immunize this world against further Communist infection through massive injections of American aid, and, wherever necessary, through direct American intervention. Such a vast undertaking has at least two defects: First, it exceeds our national capability; second, among the newly emerging nations, where the specter of Western imperialism is dreaded more than communism, such a policy can be self-defeating. As a seasoned, friendly foreign diplomat recently put it:

> The United States is getting involved in situations where no one—not even a nation of saints—would be welcome.

This is not to say that we should write off Africa or Asia. It is to say that a foreign policy of intervention, which was right for Western Europe, is apt to be wrong for those continents which have just thrown off European rule.

To begin with, the stakes in Europe were different. Had so rich an industrial prize as Western Europe ever fallen into Russian hands, the actual balance of power in the world would have shifted from us to the Soviet Union. We were obliged to regard the dividing line in Europe as though it were an American frontier, to commit our nuclear arsenal to its defense, and to station an army of American troops in West Germany as "tripwire" evidence of our determination to defend that country as though it were our own.

No nation goes this far unless its very survival hangs in the balance.

Even so, our intervention in Europe would not have succeeded without a strong mutual purpose. We were welcomed back to war-devastated Europe in 1945 to be a nuclear sentinel against further Russian aggression. It was the expansion of hostile Russian power which summoned us, not the color of the Red banner, or our distaste for the way of life inside the Soviet Union. There was no confusion among the NATO allies as to the identity of the enemy. As long as the Russian threat remained imminent, we all faced in the same direction, united by a single will.

There was still another reason for the success of our intervention in Europe—a condition so obvious that it is often overlooked, and yet so fundamental that its absence in Africa and Asia accounts for most of our setbacks on these continents. In Europe, we stood among people with whom we shared a common ancestry, whose political and economic systems were similar to our own, and whose traditional values derived from the same mainstream of historical experience that we call Western civilization. This cultural bond meant that most Europeans generally shared our aims and our point of view.

But if the inhabitants of Western Europe tend to see the world as we do, as a global arena in which "free" people are arrayed against Communists, it does not follow that Africans and Asians share this view. They have been participants in a different revolution, more potent and widespread than the Communist brand—a revolution foreshadowed two centuries ago, by the American War for Independence, and whipped into flame by Woodrow Wilson's ringing reaffirmation of the right of self-determination. Neither Marx nor Lenin fathered the revolt against colonialism, and we need not permit their successors, in Moscow or Peiping, to exploit the colonial issue to Communist advantage.

To avoid this, we must understand that, for most Africans and Asians, our concept of self-government and individual freedom is totally unreal, having never been experienced. In many, if not most, of these emergent lands, it is capitalism, not communism, which is the ugly word. The very term evokes images of the old colonial plantation and white man supremacy. Furthermore, any attempt to acquaint Africa and Asia with the miracles of modern capitalism, as witnessed in such places as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, is relatively meaningless. The under-developed world lacks the private capital with which to industrialize. Government is often the only source available to underwrite development programs. Thus, popular repugnance to capitalism combines with economic necessity to cause most of the new governments in Africa and Asia to proclaim themselves Socialist states.

Because these facts are so well known, it puzzles me that American foreign policy in Africa and Asia has not been tied to them. We have plunged into these former colonial regions as though we had been designated on high to act as trustee in bankruptcy for the broken empires.

First of all, we strained relations by trying to induce governments to line up with us in the cold war, a struggle in which few felt any real interest. Forgetting that we ourselves had insisted upon our right to stay neutral for most of our history, we assailed "neutralism" as a kind of Communist trick. Later, having painfully learned that cold war neutrality always served as a badge of, and sometimes even as an umbrella for, independence, we changed tune, but, even then, we kept on administering our aid programs in ways designed to freeze out the Russians and Chinese.

In regions craving aid from any source, our freeze-out policy was bound to give rise to cries of undue interference. Soon, African and Asian governments were demanding aid "without strings attached," while accusing the United States of practicing "neo-colonialism." Worse still, sensing that we feared competition from Communist sources, many a government craftily raised the "ante" on us, threatening to go to the Reds for

help if we failed to meet some new demand.

Neither AID nor the State Department will acknowledge submitting to this sort of diplomatic blackmail in the handling of our foreign aid program. But I have no doubt about it. Too often I have questioned an American Ambassador about a misfit project in some forlorn little country, only to be told: "If we hadn't done it, the Russians would have been asked." Knuckling under to such crude pressures has caused our prestige to go down, even as our costs have gone up.

Worst of all, we have permitted ourselves to be drawn into the internal political affairs of so many African and Asian countries that anti-American feeling is rising at an alarming rate. Our embassies are being subjected to increasingly frequent attacks, our information libraries are being sacked, and demagogs from Cairo to Djakarta court popular favor by rebuking us. Afro-Asian delegates at the U.N. castigate us with words of extraordinary violence. Clearly, the policy of intervening too much in the volatile ex-colonial regions of Africa and Asia, is backfiring on the United States.

PART II: MISTAKES IN AFRICA

Much of this could have been avoided. I visited Africa in 1960, immediately after John F. Kennedy's election, in company with two of my colleagues and the President's youngest brother, Ted. Wherever our presence became known, eager crowds would gather to shout, "Kennedy, Kennedy." The word had spread through Africa that the newly-elected President of the United States had, as a Senator in 1957, spoken up for Algeria in her war for independence against France. For the first time, our country was being identified, by Arab and Black alike, with legitimate African aspirations. Opportunity was beckoning our way.

If we had continued to champion African nationalism, the cause that counts with the people; if we had declared ourselves strongly in favor of rightful independence for the Portuguese Territories, the flaming issue in Africa today; if we had held ourselves at arms length from the shifting factional fights for power within the seething young African countries, regardless of the labels chosen to solicit outside support, I have no doubt that our influence in Africa would have kept on growing.

But we have not yet managed to harness our zeal. Rational restraints give way to emotional involvement, which, in turn, leads to more intervention. Fortunately, the Russians have made the same mistake in Africa, and now the Chinese seem eager to repeat it. Here are two examples, one Russian, one American, which constitute, in my judgment, showcase illustrations of how not to conduct a winning foreign policy in Africa:

Six years ago, Nikita Khrushchev scurried to the rescue of Sekou Touré, strong man of Guinea, after this little west African country had been stripped bare by the departing French. It seemed a perfect marriage, since the Guinean leaders, raised in the radical tradition of the French labor movement, were Marxists anyway, and anxious to establish a model Marxist state.

When I arrived in Conakry, the country's capital, in December of 1960, Guinea had taken on all the appearances of a satellite. The government had been persuaded to abandon the franc in order to impede further trade with the West, and the entire economy seemed welded into the Red bloc. Communist advisors sat beside every Government minister. Numerous Red-donated projects were under construction, including a big printing plant, and the place swarmed with communist technicians, transplanted from countries behind the Iron Curtain. Guinea had plainly been taken over.

Into this captured country, President Kennedy sent a young Ambassador, Bill Atwood. His instructions were to play it cool. He was not to lecture the Guinean dictator on the virtues of democracy, or belabor his commissars with the glories of free enterprise. He was to say it was their business, not ours, to choose the system they preferred; that we were interested only in helping them, in a modest way, with some of their problems of human suffering. Kennedy felt, if we did not press too hard, that Guinea would soon discover the Russians were not 9 feet tall.

And so it happened. It wasn't long before Guinea began to resent the heavy-handed interference of the Russians. Relations became so strained that the Soviet Ambassador was declared persona non grata, and ordered to leave the country. Meanwhile, Guinea began to reassume control over her own course. Today, her attitude toward the United States is much improved, and her ties with the West are growing again.

The mistake of too much intervention, which the Russians made in Guinea, we seem determined to duplicate in the Congo. Africans wonder why the United States, having no historic, economic, or security interests in the Congo, should so involve itself in that country's civil war. I also wonder why.

I know, of course, that the State Department regards the Congo rebels as a Communist front, though their source of supply—Algerian and Egyptian—would seem African enough. Our own envoy in Stanleyville, whose long agony with the rebels was climaxed when they forced him to eat an American flag, declared, after his rescue, that he believed the rebellion to be purely African, not Communist, in character. His statement met a response of stony silence from the American press.

For the fact is that our embrace with Moise Tshombe is popular in the United States. We see him as a vociferous anti-Communist. What matters, however, is how the Africans see him. And African animosity toward Tshombe is so intense that he is even barred from associating with other African leaders, having been physically excluded from their meetings. To them, he is the African equivalent of an "Uncle Tom," a puppet of the imperialists who uses white mercenaries to subdue his own countrymen. I doubt that Tshombe will ever win African acceptance. Our involvement with him serves only to turn the tide of African opinion increasingly against us.

PART III. THE LESSON OF PAKISTAN

Regrettably, we are creating similar problems for ourselves in Asia by the same excess of interventionism. Pakistan is a classic example. At fantastic cost, we undertook to enlarge and modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. Our theory was that this assistance would bolster the country's defenses against Russia, but it was India, contesting with Pakistan over Kashmir, which felt threatened.

Still, we persisted. After all, was not Ayub Khan, that strapping, Sandhurst-educated army man, a ruddy good chap? He had appeared before a joint session of the Congress, and addressed us in the reassuring accents of a British country squire. On the Communist issue, the Indians seemed much too conciliatory, but we felt sure Ayub Khan could be depended upon, come what may. He himself said so. To the Congress, he intoned:

> Let me tell you, that if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan.

That is past history now. Having used us for his purpose, Ayub Khan was the first to flirt with Red China, when India was attacked. The fervent courtship of Pakistan only lost us favor there. In the recent elections, the main issue between the two presidential candidates was who was the most anti-American; Ayub Khan won.

PART IV: OUR DILEMMA IN VIETNAM

To the case against excessive American intervention in Africa and Asia, the State Department has a stock answer: The Communists will not let us quit. South Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong to overthrow the Saigon Government, then the gates are open, so the argument goes, to successful Communist subversion of all the other governments in southeast Asia.

But the hard fact is that there are limits to what we can do in helping any Government surmount a Communist uprising. If the people themselves will not support the Government in power, we cannot save it. We can give arms, money, food, and supplies, but the outcome will depend, in the final analysis, upon the character of the Government helped, and the extent to which the people are willing to rally behind it.

The Saigon Government is losing its war, not for lack of equipment, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied than Saigon, but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported; it must come from within. It is nothing that we Americans can supply from our side of the Pacific. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the spoiling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese themselves can furnish the solution.

As to the other governments in southeast Asia, they are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support, and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. The Malayans, with British help, because of their own determined resistance to communism, successfully put down a long and bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars—even when nourished from without—can be won by sitting governments, but only in countries where shelter for the enemy is not furnished by the people themselves.

Our reason for being in the Orient is not that of fashioning Asian governments. It is not communism, as such, which accounts for our presence in the Far East, but rather the containment of Peiping. This can be best accomplished if China is ringed with stable, independent governments, which refuse to be the pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugoslavia has proved in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, even a Communist government can play such a role.

Due to the degree of our involvement in the internal affairs of southeast Asia, an area where China has been feared and resisted for centuries, the Peiping government is now able to pose as champion of Asia for the Asians, defying the United States in the name of opposing the revival of Western imperialism.

Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said recently to a foreign visitor:

> Once we worried about southeast Asia. We don't anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us.

It would be to our national advantage, then, to seek an international agreement for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French Indochina. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both sides, and to maintain order, while an independent and unalined new government is formed by the Vietnamese themselves.

The neutrality of the whole region could be guaranteed by the signatories to the international agreement. Thus, the military might of the United States would remain available as a deterrent against Chinese aggression from the north, which is—or ought to be—our governing national objective in southeast Asia anyway.

In like manner, we may find it in our national interest to pledge our armed might behind the defense of India, Thailand, or some other Asian government, against any future Chinese attack, that these governments might avoid the need for developing nuclear shields of their own, while we avoid the dangers of further proliferation of nuclear arsenals. This kind of guarantee, which would be a real deterrent to Chinese military aggression, lies within our capability, and would preclude a power vacuum in Asia, so feared by the architects of our present policy. If this kind of defense commitment is sufficient to prevent an overt Chinese attack upon, say, India or Thailand, it ought to suffice for the rest of southeast Asia as well.

To those who protest that such a policy will fail to protect against growing Chinese influence over such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam, brought on through intensified Communist subversion from within these countries, I submit that the scoreboard on our present policy of direct intervention in southeast Asia shows that we are now losing this contest. Burma and Cambodia, though both non-Communist Governments, have been moving steadily closer to China. Laos is in limbo, after an American involvement, at heavy cost, in that country's internal affairs, turned sour. The war in Vietnam, despite Saigon's preponderant military advantage, is going from bad to worse.

This somber truth is underlined in the events of the past fortnight—the stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon American bases in South Vietnam, and the consequent loss of more American lives. We must hope that our retaliatory bombings of military installations in North Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the strength of our will and purpose, may persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not, and never has been, a paper tiger. Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it. The military might we can bring to bear upon North Vietnam is formidable indeed, and so it would behoove the Communists to explore with us the way to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.

As the beat of the war drums intensifies, and passions rise on both sides, I recognize that negotiation becomes more difficult. Already cries of "appeasement" are being directed at anyone who speaks up for a negotiated settlement of this escalating war. So soon the country seems to have forgotten the wise words of John F. Kennedy, that we should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

All of us recognize the heavy burden of decision which our President bears. And we would do well to remember that the seal of his office is an American eagle, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch represents our best hope for avoiding a widening war in Asia.

Those who would use the arrows alone are actually calling for war. The systematic and sustained bombing of North Vietnam, unattended by any proffered recourse to the bargaining table, can only lead us into war. North Vietnam, lacking air and sea power, must answer on the ground. Her response, in the form of added military pressures against the south, Saigon can hardly be expected to withstand. As a consequence, the next step will be to send American land forces into battle, thus converting the struggle into an American war on the Asian mainland. That China will, sooner or later, enter such a war, I have no doubt.

Let those who urge this course upon us answer for its consequences. A spreading war on the Asian mainland, pitting American troops against Asian troops, is a war we cannot finish. In the end, after a tragic trail of casualties out of all proportion to our real national interest, we will have to negotiate a settlement with the Communists, even as such a truce was finally negotiated in Korea. The question really is not whether we should negotiate, but when.

To those who say that we must not parley now, because we would bargain from a position of weakness, I reply that they take too restricted a view of our strategic position in southeast Asia. They look only to the plight of the war in South Vietnam, forgetting that American power in southeast Asia rests not upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon the strength of our own possession of the sea and air. Our recent retaliatory blows should make it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not quit under fire, nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist coercion. We can strike back with relative impunity, from floating bases which are beyond Communist reach, and inflict heavy punishment upon them. Ours is not a position of weakness from which to deal.

So I would hope that the President of the United States will undertake to use, not only his arrows, but his olive branch as well. Willingness to parley is not a sign of weakness, but the symbol of strength, nor should it destroy what remains of the fighting morale of the South Vietnamese. Negotiations preceded the end of the fighting in Korea by nearly 2 years. In South Vietnam, the active bargaining for a peaceful solution could even lift morale by offering some hope to the people that there might come an end to their ordeal. Moreover, an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement would not be incompatible with the keeping of our pledge to give military aid and advice to the Saigon Government.

PART V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although it is natural for our attention to be fixed upon the gathering crisis in Vietnam, I nonetheless commenced this address with the purpose of undertaking a general review of American foreign policy throughout the whole of the ex-colonial world. My thesis has been that we have allowed ourselves to become overinvolved in both Africa and Asia. In saying this, I fully recognize that the United States cannot withdraw to seek refuge within some happy hunting ground of our own choosing.

But it is mandatory, in these former colonial areas, that we establish foreign policy goals which are not beyond our reach; that we observe priorities which correspond with our real national interests; that we concern ourselves less with other peoples' ideologies, and that we adopt techniques which are sensitive to, and compatible with, the prevailing sentiment of the people in each great region of the world. Measured by these criteria, we are too deeply involved in the internal affairs of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia.

I believe that President Johnson intends, in a prudent and responsible way, to redress the balance. His emphasis on attending to the neglected problems at home in sensible. The longrun influ-

ences we exert abroad will hinge, in large measure, upon the kind of society we build in our own land.

In any reappraisal of American foreign policy in the underdeveloped world, so recently freed from colonial bondage, we would do well to recall the wise words of President Kennedy, spoken in November of 1961:

We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we cannot always impose our will on the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity, and that therefore, there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following articles: Two excellent columns written by James Reston and published in the February 12 and February 14 issues of the New York Times, respectively; and an article written by Mr. Roscoe Drummond, captioned "Missing Ingredient in Our Vietnam Policy," and published in the Washington Post this morning, February 17.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Feb. 12, 1965]

WASHINGTON: WHAT ARE OUR AIMS IN VIETNAM?

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 11.—The first casualty in every shooting war is commonsense, and the second is free and open discussion.

An extraordinary situation now exists in Vietnam. A conscripted American armed force is now engaged in increasingly severe air raids in North Vietnam without even a speech by the President in explanation of his present thinking on the crisis.

The big black limousines arrive and depart from the White House. Brief statements are issued by press officers on the latest military operations and casualties. Influential legislators express the gravest apprehension in private about the trend of events, but most of them remain silent on the floor of Congress.

Meanwhile, the propaganda machine is beginning to turn over, the the front pages are filling up with pictures of the American wounded and those almost meaningless aerial photographs of villages burning in the jungle.

THE AMBIGUITIES

This is no time to be dogmatic about what should be done in Vietnam. Nobody but the President and his most intimate advisers has enough information about the situation in Saigon, Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow to pass judgment, and his advisers are deeply divided on the best course of action.

But the least the President can do is to go before the country and explain his objectives. "There can be and there must be," he said in a campaign speech on Vietnam last August 5—which is about the only speech he has made on the subject—"no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose." But there is doubt all over Washington tonight about both America's policy and purpose.

At various times we have been told that our purpose was merely (1) to help the South Vietnamese Government help itself; and then, again, it was (2) to defend the "vital security interests" of the United States; (3) to stop the Communist infiltration blow the 17th parallel; (4) to prevent the conquest of all of southeast Asia from Chinese Communist domination, and (5) to win a victory over the aggressors.

SLOWDOWN OR SHOWDOWN?

Sometimes one of these quite different aims has been given, sometimes another, and in absence of an up-to-date explanation by the President of where he is going now, there is a babble of influential voices in Washington, some of them concerned to avoid risk of war with China and some insisting that it is better to have a showdown with China now than later when she will be stronger.

There is widespread support here for a policy of making clear to the Communists that the United States cannot be attacked with impunity and that the cost of a Communist victory in South Vietnam would cost the Communists more than it is worth.

It is also generally recognized in the capital that the chaos in the South Vietnamese Government was leading to a political collapse, that that trend had to be reversed, and that failure to punish the Communist aggressors for hitting our bases would have been interpreted all over the world as a weakness that would have demoralized the South Vietnamese.

Accordingly, very few people here would deny that the United States, as a result of its limited policy of retaliation against bases in the south of North Vietnam, has placed itself in a stronger position to negotiate a settlement, but is this the President's purpose?

THE CHINA BORDER

Before long there will be few bases to bomb in the south of Communist Vietnam. The farther north we bomb, the closer we will come to the Red China border and the greater will be the danger of a Communist Chinese response, maybe in Vietnam, but also maybe in Korea, where China's manpower would be more effective.

"The Chinese people cannot stand idly by," said Peiping 10 days after the American Army crossed the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950, and we brushed it off in a mood very similar to the mood here now. "The 650 million Chinese people," said Peiping again this week, "will definitely not stand idly by and are well prepared in this respect."

DON'T THINK: ACT

Despite the similarity of the two statements, the risk of Chinese intervention is not rated very high here, so long as the bombing does not get close to the China border, but as things now stand events are increasingly deciding what we do, and the longer this elaborate game of "chicken" goes on, the farther north we are likely to go.

Even if we forget the Communist Chinese, we are having a bad enough time with the North Vietnamese guerrillas—a highly trained but comparatively small force—but what do we do if our bombings provoke the regular North Vietnamese Army of a quarter of a million men into an invasion of South Vietnam against 23,000 "advisers"?

In such a situation it is easier to act than think, and the satisfaction of acting is probably greater. A policy of retaliation to negotiate from a position of strength and equality would be widely supported here, but we do not know whether this is what the President has in mind, and we do know that some of his aids want far, far more.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 14, 1965]

WASHINGTON: THE UNDECLARED AND UNEXPLAINED WAR

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 13.—The time has come to call a spade a bloody shovel. This country is in an undeclared and unexplained war in Vietnam. Our masters have a lot of long and fancy names for it, like escalation and retaliation, but it is war just the same.

The cause of the war is plain enough. The North Vietnamese Communists, with the aid of Red China and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, have sent their guerrillas into South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, for the express purpose of taking over the Government and territory of South Vietnam.

AMERICA'S RESPONSE

The course of the war is equally plain. We were getting licked in South Vietnam. The Communists were steadily defeating the South Vietnamese armed forces, terrorizing a war-weary and indifferent population, and taking advantage of a divided and quarrelsome South Vietnamese Government.

More than that, the Communists were stepping up their attacks on the bases and barracks which serve the 23,000 American troops in South Vietnam, and it was in response to this that President Johnson ordered the bombing attacks on the Communist military installations in the south of North Vietnamese territory.

Very few people here question the necessity for a limited expansion of the war by U.S. bombers into Communist territory. The American and South Vietnamese position was crumbling fast, and the political and strategic consequences of defeat would have been serious for the free world all over Asia.

There is a point, however, where this exercise will become critical. As the military targets in the southern part of Communist Vietnam are knocked out, and our bombers move northward, they will soon come within the range of the North Vietnamese and Red Chinese MIG fighters, and if we get into that situation, the presure for attacks on the air bases in North Vietnam and South China will steeply increase.

The immediate problem, therefore, is how to put enough pressure on the North Vietnamese to bring them into negotiations for a settlement of the war, without provoking a mass Communist counterattack we are in no position to meet.

This is a delicate and highly dangerous situation. The United States has the air and naval power to wipe out North Vietnam and the Chinese Air Force, if it comes into the battle. But the North Vietnamese have a quarter of a million men under arms who have never been committed to the battle at all, and few observers in Washington believe this force could be stopped without the intervention of a very large American Army on the ground.

THE SILENT WHITE HOUSE

Nobody has made all this clear to the American people. President Johnson has not made a major speech on the details of this war since he entered the White House. Neither did President Kennedy. We have had one long speech on the subject by Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 26 of last year, and a lot of statements here and in Saigon, many of them highly optimistic and misleading. But the fact is that we are in a war that is not only undeclared and unexplained, but that has not even been widely debated in the Congress or the country.

The whole history of this century testifies to the difficulty of predicting the consequences of war. We imposed a policy of unconditional surrender on the Kaiser only to find that the two greater menaces of communism and nazism took his place. One of the main objectives of the two World Wars was the freedom of Eastern Europe, which ended up with less freedom under the Communists than it had before.

LIMITING THE WAR

Few people here question that President Johnson wants to limit the war in Vietnam and avoid a ground war on the continent of Asia, but the future is not wholly in his control. He may be bombing merely to force a negotiated settlement, but the Chinese and the North Vietnamese don't know that. In fact, neither do the American people, whose airmen are carrying out the President's orders.

Nor, for that matter, do the allies, who are treaty bound to support us if we get into a larger war in southeast Asia. They will undoubtedly support a policy of limited retaliation in North Vietnam if it is for the purpose of negotiating a settlement, but they will not support us for long unless we define and limit our aims.

The implications of this war, then, extend far beyond Vietnam. President Johnson's hopes of building a strong alliance with Japan and the other free nations of Asia are not likely to be promoted by replaying the old script of American planes once more bombing Asians.

He has started on a massive program of reconstruction and development at home, but he can forget about his Great Society if he gets bogged down in a major land war in Asia on territory favorable to the enemy. Freedom expands in peace and authoritarian government in war, and this is precisely the danger now, for the Communists have the manpower to cause us an almost unmanageable situation not only in Vietnam but in Korea, and force us into a war that could divert our energies from the larger constructive purposes of the Nation.

In this situation it is difficult to understand why the problem is not discussed more openly by the President, why the terms of an honorable settlement are not defined, and why the negotiating efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations and other world statesmen are so blithely brushed aside.

It is true that the instability, weakness and sensitivities of the South Vietnamese Government have to be kept in mind but nobody is suggesting a sellout at their expense. The talk here is not about a Munich agreement but a Korean agreement in which South Vietnam, like South Korea, would be in a better position to order its own life.

This would not be ideal, but it would be better for the South Vietnamese and for the United States than what we have now, and it would be better for North Vietnam and China than a larger war.

CHINA'S DANGER

For if this dangerous game gets out of hand, it is not likely that China's new industries, including her atomic installations at Taklamakan Desert in Central Sinkiang, will be spared. What her manpower can grab beyond her borders would be worth far less than what she would lose at home.

Somebody, however, has to make a move to reverse the trend and stop the present crooked course. For the moment, we seem to be standing mute in Washington, paralyzed before a great issue, and merely digging our thought deeper into the accustomed military rut.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1965]

VIETNAM POLICY—THE MISSING INGREDIENT

(By Roscoe Drummond)

There is a missing ingredient in American policy in Vietnam.

From everything which has been said—and left unsaid—by the White House, the evidence is that President Johnson:

Intends to step up the retaliation enough to persuade North Vietnam that the aggression will be too costly to continue.

Wants to avoid intensifying it to the degree that it will lead to all-out war.

In a word, if I read correctly Mr. Johnson's words and actions, they mean that the United States aims to expand the war for a limited purpose and to avoid expanding the war beyond that purpose.

The purpose: to bring North Vietnam to accept a settlement that would insure the independence of South Vietnam, to which Hanoi pledged itself in 1954 and again in 1962.

Has this riskful and delicate operation got any fair chance of success?

It may have, but only if the missing ingredient is forthcoming at the right time.

The missing ingredient, which it seems to me, must accompany new air thrusts against North Vietnam, is a major U.S. peace offensive, to make it clear that we seek only an end to the aggression, that we have no desire to inflict unnecessary blows, that our sole objective is a settlement mutually tolerable to both sides—whenever Hanoi will cease and desist.

I am not talking about an appeasement peace. There is no reason to believe the White House has any such thing in mind. But I am suggesting that, if the Johnson aim of a controlled expansion of the fighting as an essential persuader to Hanoi is to succeed, there must simultaneously be a peace offensive to convince Hanoi that it has a reasonable acceptable alternative to all-out war.

More military action by itself could well bring unlimited expansion of the war.

A peace offensive by itself could only bring an intolerable appeasement.

Together they make sense—and could make headway toward the President's goal.

It is not likely that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong would be persuaded by either war action or peace action alone. The reason is that Hanoi and Peiping have long been convinced that the United States would not have the will and the patience to hang on, that the South Vietnamese Government was getting weaker, and that it would be foolish—for them—to give away at the conference table what they felt sure they were winning on the battlefield.

No wonder Ho Chi Minh has shown no interest in negotiation. For months we have talked stronger than we have acted. We have warned—and done little. We have conferred with ourselves—and done little. Now we are beginning to act more meaningfully.

But to bring North Vietnam to the conference table will take more than the few retaliations we have lately made. It will undoubtedly take persistent and heavy military pressure from the air and naval resources we have mobilized in the area. If Ho Chi Minh is to be persuaded to accept anybody's invitation to the conference table, it will have to be made clear that the only practical choice is between ending the war or suffering widespread devastation.

It is profoundly riskful to think we can expand the war in Vietnam and control its expansion at the same time. We must do it with our eyes open.

The only way this can be done with the least risk is to mount a peace offensive which would make our purpose clear and credible to allies and enemies alike.

My assumption is that such plans are well advanced within the Johnson administration and that the President is waiting for the proper time.

Mr. McGOVERN obtained the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield, without losing my right to the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I wish to say to the distinguished Senator from Idaho that I had hoped to address some remarks to the Senate sometime today in response to his address. I doubt whether, within the compass of time and the duties still before me, I shall have the opportunity to do so. However, I trust that there may be an opportunity tomorrow to respond to some portions of the Senator's address.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator from Illinois for his comment. I shall look forward with interest to whatever he may say on the subject tomorrow.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Idaho on his statement. I say to the distinguished minority leader, for whatever it is worth, that, not on the high level he occupies, but on the very low level of my own status here, I hope to respond yet this evening to this very excellent discussion of policy, with which I take some issue, and that I shall await with eagerness the comments of the Senator from Illinois tomorrow, because his comments are often of great guidance to us who indulge in discussions of this type.

Mr. DIRKSEN. My friend from Wyoming must never demean his position or prestige, because, in my judgment, he occupies a high plateau and a place of high confidence in these great halls. I am always prepared to listen to him with the greatest of circumspection and humility.

I often sit at his feet to listen, knowing, of course, that he has occupied high places on a university faculty and has given much time during his life to a study of historic trends. So I am confident that I can listen and learn.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator from Illinois for his comments. Probably I should quit while I am ahead. However, for the RECORD, I wanted to have an understanding. Do I correctly understand that the Senator from South Dakota intends to project his thoughts, roughly along the same line, and that it might be to the advantage of the discussion if I were to withhold my questions and my comments until, perhaps, his remarks were also a part of the RECORD?

Mr. McGOVERN. I plan to speak for 12 or 15 minutes. If the Senator from Wyoming wishes to make his remarks first, I shall be glad to defer to him.

Mr. McGEE. In the interest of being orderly and talking about the same subject, so that we shall not have to switch back and forth, as if we were watching a tennis match, it might be better if both speeches were in the RECORD.

Mr. CHURCH. I am advised by the senior Senator from Missouri that he wishes to ask a question or two. Then I shall be happy to yield the floor, unless the Senator wishes to propound questions to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair has recognized the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield for a question?

Mr. CHURCH. I shall be happy to yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. First, although it has not been possible for me to be in the Chamber during all of the Senator's remarks, I am pleased to have had the opportunity to read his thought-provoking address. I hope that every Member of the Senate will also read it.

The question I should like to ask is one to which I am sure the distinguished Senator has given much attention in constructing the philosophy that he has so ably presented this evening; that is,

exactly what does he think we can do from the standpoint of relative disengagement in South Vietnam as against maintaining the status quo or moving more definitely to the north?

Mr. CHURCH. First, I should say that I have not advocated withdrawal from South Vietnam or any repudiation of the pledges we have made to the Saigon government. In every instance that I have spoken on this subject, I have tried, at least, to make it clear that this country keeps its commitments, and that the United States, under mounting Communist pressure, ought not to withdraw from South Vietnam.

I have also spoken up on several occasions in support of the action that President Johnson has taken in ordering bombings in retaliation for the increased attacks upon American personnel.

As a prelude to the response that I shall make to the Senator, let me again say that I support the President in what he has done thus far.

When the President ordered these bombings, clearly his action was intended to demonstrate the strength of American will and purpose. It was intended to show Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not a paper tiger, and that we will not be forced out of South Vietnam by stepped-up Communist coercion.

The necessary correlate to this position, it seems to me, is a willingness to make clear to the world the conditions for peace in southeast Asia. We should define with clarity and precision what our objectives are in being there. I submit, with all deference to the State Department, that there has not yet been a consistent, clear-cut definition of the American purpose. The confusion has been compounded by conflicting statements as to our purpose.

If our objective is to immunize southeast Asia from Chinese interest or activity, to dam off this part of the world from what has traditionally been a sphere of influence for China, then I say that our goal is unrealistic and foredoomed to failure, in the long course of events. China is the biggest power in Asia. It is a dominant force. China desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in southeast Asia like that she maintained under the Chinese emperors.

If we were to say that it is American policy—if it were in fact our purpose—to immunize southeast Asia from Chinese influence, this is a policy which will not succeed. It runs contrary to the physical power relationships in Asia. It would be as though the Chinese were to say to us, "Quit trying to assert a dominant American interest in Mexico." I do not believe this is the policy. Rather, our purpose in Asia, is the containment of China. We went back to Western Europe to prevent further Russian expansion. Our presence in Asia is related to the containment of Peiping.

Now, the best way to contain the power of Peiping is to ring China with independent, stable governments. I do not think that, in the long run, we shall be able to determine what the character of these governments will be. I do not believe that this matters so much as the independence of those governments.

Therefore, I should think that it would be in the interest of the United States to begin to do in Asia what we have long been doing in Europe—recognizing that the satellite countries are restless, that they are not all alike, not dominated by the Kremlin to the same degree. We are watching each one working its way out from under the Kremlin's grip, recognizing that Tito's Yugoslavia is, in fact, largely independent from the direction and control of Russia.

I cannot see why, in the face of what has happened to the Communist satellites in Europe, the same experience will not also occur in Asia. Therefore, I should like, in answer to the question of the senior Senator from Missouri, to state that the struggle in southeast Asia is one which eventually must find a political, rather than a military, settlement.

In a widened military involvement, we can lose many men. We lost 157,000, dead and wounded, in Korea. The fighting cost us $18 billion. But, in the end, we had to go to the conference table. There had to be a political settlement. So it is with southeast Asia.

So, I should hope that our Government would make clear that a peaceful settlement is our objective in southeast Asia; that we are willing to consider—either through the intervention of the United Nations, or through another Geneva Conference—the prospects for a political solution in southeast Asia which would neutralize the area and provide for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops. We could guarantee the integrity of that neutrality with the full strength of American might. This would be using American military power in a way that could be effective, as a deterrent to Chinese encroachment upon her neighbors.

I submit that our present policy, on the scoreboard, is not one to give us reassurance, for Chinese hegemony grows in southeast Asia every day.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate the lucid presentation of the senior Senator from Idaho on the subject. I mentioned before that I think he has made a magnificent address.

I am looking for some practical applications of his concept. For example, I would like to see more trade and less aid as an American policy. I mentioned earlier today that when I asked the former Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Hodges, and the present Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dillon, if they knew of any highly developed country in the free world, that was not doing its best to get as much trade as possible from behind the Iron Curtain, both in exports to those countries and imports from them. They both said no, that our country was the only country that, for ideological or any other reasons, was not trying to improve its trade position.

I also mentioned that I felt trade was perhaps the best way in which to obtain a better understanding between nations, and the normal relationship between businessmen who are looking forward to an arrangement that both sides consider satisfactory.

It is a little ridiculous for us to keep nearly a million military people, counting their dependents, living in Germany, as we have for so many years. We should, in the interest of our balance-of-payments problem, withdraw a large number of those people. I am confident that would not affect anything from the standpoint of our commitments.

But what I would like to ask my able friend from Idaho is, What does he think would be the best specific course that we could take at this time in South Vietnam? If I have any disagreement with him, it is over the statement that the President should emphasize his desire for peace. I am sure the Senator agrees that the President has emphasized his desire for peace in that part of the world, as well as all other parts of the world.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. My point is that we should accompany the stepped-up military moves with a peace initiative, making clear what we regard the essential prerequisites to be for an acceptable political settlement that will bring peace to southeast Asia and provide for an independent and unalined Vietnam.

The Senator knows it is not possible for any Member of the Senate to specify the exact form that our proposal might take or what we might finally agree to at the conference table.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The question I wish to ask the distinguished Senator is what bargaining table he has in mind, and where.

Mr. CHURCH. I cite the fact that we went to Geneva over Laos. We had spent $325 million to build a Laotian army that refused to fight. The war in Laos was going against us. In another 60 days, the country would have fallen into the lap of the Communists. President Kennedy took us to the Geneva conference table. Today, there is no one, including our Ambassador in Saigon, who does not say that the situation in Laos, after the neutralization worked out at the Geneva conference table, is better than it was before. This is an indication of what can be done through negotiations.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The only reason I am asking the question is that I am very much impressed with the statement of my friend and colleague on the Foreign Relations Committee. Would the Senator think of starting with a conference at Geneva; and if so, who should be at the bargaining table?

Mr. CHURCH. These are matters which should be left to the President, of necessity. We entered negotiations over Laos at the point of failure, when continuation of the war would have meant a Communist seizure of the country. We may be in a somewhat similar situation in South Vietnam. But I would have the President indicate what the prerequisites might be for going to

the bargaining table. I am not in a position to specify these conditions on the Senate floor, which only the President and the Secretary of State could properly undertake to do, but I am sure they would do it in a manner safeguarding American interests.

We have had several opportunities. Mr. U Thant has urged using the good offices of the United Nations in seeking a solution of the Vietnam issue. President de Gaulle has made suggestions. I am sure other opportunities will arise, because neither side can win a clean victory in southeast Asia, and neither side really wants war. Korea was a lesson for all. There was no victory for us in Korea. Neither would there be from widening the war in southeast Asia. In a situation where both sides stand to lose so much in a war which neither wants, it seems to me the opportunity is ripe to reach a political settlement, to use the olive branch of the Presidential Seal, even as we use the arrows.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for his kindness in listening to my questions.

Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator for asking them.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. First, I would make a matter of public record the fact that the Senator from Idaho and I learned many of these lessons together, side by side, in the countries that seem to be having so much trouble.

Mr. CHURCH. In connection with an article of mine that was published in the New York Times Magazine on Sunday, there is a picture in which the Senator from Wyoming appears with the Senator from Idaho, taken in Vietnam. I do not want that picture to implicate the Senator from Wyoming in the article or in the views I am expressing this afternoon.

Mr. McGEE. Basically, it comes as a matter of compliment to the Senator from Wyoming in view of the high level of the remarks submitted by the Senator from Idaho. Our experiences together in Africa, Asia, and Saigon in particular, have deeply affected the thinking of both of us.

The real point of my interruption is to address myself to the excellent statement the Senator has made in regard to why we are in Vietnam. Why are we there as compared to the situation in Western Europe, when, after the war, we were all eager to go home? We were determined to contain the Russians. We had the courage to prevent the Russians from moving ahead. The Senator pointed out that there is a difference between Vietnam and Western Europe, the difference being in the sophistication of the people. Those people are capable of a correct assessment of the situation. But what I think he suggests is that when the chips were down in Western Europe, we did not say: "This is a matter of interest to us. We are ready to fight, but let us sit down and talk about it." Instead, we served notice on Moscow that starting in Western Europe, with West Germany and in Berlin, we were ready to fight now if the Russians intended to try to move into those areas. We made it unalterably clear that that was our position. The consequence was that the Russians backed off.

Two years earlier, we did the same thing in Greece where, it is true, the Government did not have the support of the people. For the most part, Greece was in the throes of a civil war, on a considerably higher level than the one now going on in Vietnam, but civil war, nonetheless.

The question that took first priority was the encroachment from the north of Communist forces across the border. We had to back not the good guys but the bad guys in Greece—to put it simply in the vernacular. We did not back the people. We backed the monarchy; we backed those who happened to be in the driver's seat at that moment. We took a chance on Greece raising its level of economy and in improving the quality of its own government. It was a case of putting first things first. As a result of the strong position which we made clear was ours in Greece, the Russians backed off.

I submit that the analogy is now valid in Vietnam. It has been valid all along. It was valid when we went in, immediately after 1954. To complete the point in Vietnam, what worked under the Communist pressure from Moscow in 1946, 1947, and 1948, has to work in different terms, but still work now—that is we must make it clear that in Vietnam, much as we would like to see a different government and even a democratic government for them, the first thing we insist upon is that there be no additional encroachment by forces from the north.

I believe that the moment we try to lop the whole area into the category of a discussion, we then are daring to negotiate the status of the line that really was a sacred line in Germany, in Berlin, and in Greece.

There should be the same sacred line in Vietnam. Even though we went to the conference table, after the fighting in Korea, we drew a line that was consistent with our purpose—respecting the agreement that had already been reached there; and we stabilized the picture even though it involved the presence of American troops. But a divided Korea, two Berlins, two Germanys, two Chinas, and two Vietnams seem to be our starting place, and not our negotiable area.

For that reason, I suggest that the Senator's wise drawing of the issue in Europe and in stopping Russian communism pertains equally in the drawing of the line in southeast Asia.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in response to the very able statement of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], let me say, first of all, that I fear it illustrates the danger of argument by analogies which really are not based upon the same underlying facts.

It also tends to point up the need for a more precise definition of American objectives in southeast Asia.

I say with all deference to the Senator from Wyoming that I have the same trouble with his statement that I have with statements made by the State Department on the situation in southeast Asia. There were very good reasons for the success of our containment policy in Europe. I believe it is important to draw a sharp distinction between Europe and southeast Asia, and not to paint the picture in broad-brush strokes, as though there were no difference between Western Europe and Russian expansionism after World War II, and the kind of problem we are facing in the jungles of Vietnam today.

I suggest that the difference is as great as that between Western Europe and southeast Asia in terms of the people, of values, of governmental systems, and of outlook. Therefore, to say that this is all one big problem, and that the same policy of containment that worked 15 years ago in Europe is going to work in southeast Asia today is, to me, a fundamental error.

The reason why our policy has failed to produce the desired results in so many parts of Asia and Africa is that there is so different an attitude in Africa and Asia toward the Western World.

These continents have just emerged from centuries of colonial bondage. I served in Burma, in India, and in China during the war. The only common link among the people I encountered was their great resentment of the white man.

These factors, which count for so much in Asia, were not present in Europe. There, we Americans were, more or less, of the same family. We were part of the same mainspring of Western civilization. We had cultural values, economic and political systems sufficiently alike, so that we shared a common repugnance to communism. I do not believe it follows that Africans or Asians feel the same way, or see communism in the same light that we do. I believe that these factors are so fundamental that they must be taken into account if an intelligent American policy is to be formulated for so different a part of the world.

The Senator states that we must draw the line in South Vietnam the way the line was drawn in Europe. I say that if I had a better idea of exactly what our objective is in southeast Asia, I would have a better basis for evaluating our policy. So would the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE], so would the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], and so would the people of the United States who will have to fight, should it come to that.

I suggest that in Vietnam we are confronted with a different kind of problem. Everyone who writes about it, agrees to this.

At the moment, the Chinese are not there. They have not come down with their armies. They have not dropped the Bamboo Curtain on southeast Asia and backed it up with Chinese divisions. The war in Vietnam has been between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, to determine whether the country will be reunited, and under what kind of government. Thus far, most of the combatants have been South Vietnamese. The pro-Communist South Vietnamese, called the Vietcong, and the anti-Com-

munist South Vietnamese, rallied—if that is not too strong a word—around whatever government is sitting in Saigon. It has been essentially a civil war, even though aided and abetted from the north.

What north are we talking about?

We are talking about Hanoi. The most significant help Peiping has given, thus far, is some Mig fighters, sent down recently. Most of the Chinese participation, so far, has been verbal service to the cause. There has been some instruction on the art of guerrilla warfare, but the Chinese are not there in any physical sense, certainly not to the same degree that we are there in a physical sense. This is essentially a war among the Vietnamese.

I submit to the Senator from Wyoming that the Chinese doubtlessly desire the communization of Vietnam, but the method is insurrection, and the people involved in that subversive effort are Vietnamese.

If we believe that a white Western nation can intervene and take over this kind of war, convert it into an American war, and then settle it in any durable way, I simply disagree.

There are limits to what we can do in assisting a country which is gripped in insurrection involving brother against brother.

Since there are limitations, let us recognize them. Let us define our goals. Let us decide what we are really out to do. Then let us see if that can be done through the processes of negotiation.

I have tried to make it clear that, in gaining this objective, American power must be brought to bear. I have endorsed what the President has done in his use of American power. I believe a widening war may be averted through the judicious use of power, and with a policy that clearly undertakes to mark the course to the bargaining table, where we can ascertain whether or not our objectives can be attained.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Idaho is so eloquent and well informed on this question that I am reluctant even to press the matter further. I believe he makes an excellent point when he says that communism in Asia and in Africa is a far different thing to these people than it was to the residents of Western Europe. I believe we would all get closer to the nub of the real problem that faces us now in Asia if we would not talk so much about communism and talk more about power politics.

Mr. CHURCH. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. McGEE. Herein we find the explanations not only for the American presence, but the goal that should epitomize the American past.

In the wake of World War II, if I may submit the historical parallel, the nations of the world fell into the throes of the same historic conflict that followed in the wake of nearly every one of the great wars of history, and that is to put back together again the pieces and to reconstitute some kind of accepted balance of power as mans' only substitute for continuing war up to this time.

World War II was especially harsh on the conventional balance of power. Not only had three nations gone down to defeat; namely, Italy, Germany, Japan, but even two of the victorious powers were so strapped by the war that they could not continue their historic relationships. I speak, of course, of our allies, France and England.

Nonetheless it behooves us to do what we can, as one of the allies, one of the victors, to try to reconstitute a balance that will be as favorable to our common cause as possible. That is what has been taking place since 1945. That is what happened in Berlin, in West Germany, in Greece, and around the globe, to such an extent that it is possible to draw a firm line all the way from Finland, down across Eastern Europe, across Greece and Turkey, Iraq and Iran, Pakistan and India, all the way to the China Sea, except for the embarrassing fluid gap that still exists. Neither side has been able to firm up conditions in southeast Asia.

What I am saying to the Senator is not that I disagree with the imperativeness of negotiation; but I believe in negotiation at the right time, and that now is not that time.

We must close the last remaining gap. Although conditions in Vietnam are entirely different in many ways than they were in Europe or than they are in Latin America or anywhere else, the one thing that is present that was present in Europe and is present in the other areas around the fringe of either Soviet imperialistic design or of the Chinese is sheer political calculation.

It should have been spelled out before this time, for in my judgment, if we, through a policy of hesitation, or a policy of premature negotiation, make it possible for the Chinese, as a case in point, to move into southeast Asia, however surreptitiously, we jeopardize the political balance in the world.

That empire in southeast Asia is the last large resource area outside the control of any one of the major powers on the globe. In the hands of one it becomes a power calculation that can upset the balance in the world.

Before we can talk or negotiate, we must make certain that there is no equivocation about where we stand and about where we have drawn the line.

President Kennedy said that we can always negotiate freely, but we must not negotiate freedom.

I believe this must be the issue laid down on the firming of the line on this the last segment of a power vacuum in the world. Then we shall be in a position to start talking about the kind of world we want.

Mr. CHURCH. In response to——

Mr. McGEE. May I finish? As we draw that line, we are only completing the sequence of the policy bases and the power commitments for the benefit of a balance in the world that was begun back in 1946. I believe the price we have already paid for this opportunity ought to give us pause about slowing down until we have fully reconstituted the balance in the world.

I believe that the condition of the Vietnamese people, and the direction in which their future may be going, are at this stage secondary, not primary. I believe that is where we become confused. We must keep first things first, as we did in Greece in the civil war there.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator intends to speak later in further extension of his thoughts. I merely wish to restate briefly what I have said. I understand the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] has been waiting patiently to make his speech; and other Senators may wish to speak also.

China is not now in Vietnam—either in North Vietnam or in South Vietnam. We are now demonstrating the strength of the American position in southeast Asia stemming from our domination of the air and the sea. Therefore, I do not believe that we would negotiate from weakness.

The danger of using our military strength alone and extending the bombing northward, unaccompanied by any preferred recourse to the bargaining table, can lead only to a worsening situation.

Once the bombing goes further north, the danger increases that North Vietnam must respond; and the only means she has is on the ground. Saigon is obviously too weak to withstand such further pressures. So the demand will follow for American ground troops. The last time we had a similar experience, this led to Chinese involvement. We can go down that road again, with all the attendant pain, cost, and tragedy. But, in the end, we shall come back to the conference table, as we did in Korea, with China as well as North Vietnam to contend with; and large parts of southeast Asia in Chinese occupation.

That kind of situation would not auger well for a satisfactory settlement. I disagree with the Senator from Wyoming when he says that we should wait until some time later, until after the military situation has changed. It seems to me that, given a spreading war, the military situation will only worsen. So, I think we should combine our military effort in South Vietnam with an indicated willingness to negotiate.

Since I have kept the Senator from South Dakota waiting, which has not been fair to him, I should like to yield to him now so that he can deliver his speech. Then I shall be happy to remain to discuss these questions further with the Senator from Wyoming after the Senator from South Dakota has concluded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield to me for 1 minute?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Idaho has given a great deal of thought to the subject, as I have also. I shall have some additional suggestions to make for discussion purposes which I believe will meet the kind of objections that he has raised, or answer the serious questions that he has posed and which bother him at the present time. I wish only to express the hope that no one will leave out of any calculation the idea what we are

talking about is Hanoi, and that the Chinese mainland and Government are not specifically involved. We know that China has not joined its armies with the Vietcong yet.

Mr. CHURCH. China is indeed the reason for our presence in southeast Asia. I have expressed doubts as to whether our policy is properly directed toward the effective containment of Peiping. The Chinese involvement in southeast Asia could become a great deal worse than it is today.

I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his indulgence.

Mr. McGOVERN. It has been a great educational experience on the part of the Senator from South Dakota. Before I begin my remarks, I should like to yield briefly to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Idaho for an exceptionally fine speech. This is a most thoughtful presentation by a practical, hardheaded internationalist. The Senator from Idaho vigorously supports our position in the world as the defender of freedom. He speaks as one who seeks to strengthen our role and improve our position in international affairs.

His words are a refreshing and thoughtful contribution to the dialog on our role in Vietnam.

I shall not attempt to elaborate on the thoughts expressed by him. He covered that ground thoroughly enough. However, one aspect of this continuing and ever-changing dialog on our role in Vietnam is worthy of attention. That aspect is: What is the conception of our presence in South Vietnam? and, should we change it?

Increasingly, in recent months, we have heard the voices of many who seem to have the view that the war there is in fact our war and that we should and must make the necessary investment of men and material to win at whatever the cost.

If that is our mission there, as some seem to believe, the rules of the game have been rather dramatically changed. I do not think our mission has been changed and I do not think it should be.

From the very beginning of our involvement it has been clear that our mission is a very limited one. Three Presidents have clearly stated the proposition that our role is simply to give aid and technical advice with the objective of helping establish an independent, viable regime that is capable of managing its own affairs.

On October 23, 1954, when President Eisenhower first offered aid to Vietnam, he stated:

> The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms.

On September 2, 1963, President Kennedy reaffirmed this policy:

> I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort.

And on August 12, 1965, President Johnson described the primary pattern of our effort over the last 10 years:

> First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.

When we first agreed to help South Vietnam, French armies had just suffered a disastrous defeat at Dienbienphu. After spending an estimated $8.5 billion, after committing more than 400,000 first-rate soldiers, and after suffering 240,000 casualties, the French learned it is almost impossible to win a jungle war in Asia, except at incredible cost. As the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, recently told the Senate, most responsible American officials realize that "it would be very unwise under any circumstances to put a large land army on the Asian Continent."

Our national policy has been to help with advice and material, but not to substitute our forces for those of the South Vietnamese Government, nor to join with them in a land war, nor to fight their war for them. Our military personnel in Vietnam number only 24,000.

Based on our experience of 10 years in Vietnam it clearly would be folly to expand our mission or the original concept of our involvement. When we became engaged there in 1954 I do not think anyone expected we would still be there in 1965. Certainly we do not intend to stay there until 1975. At some stage we must make a decision on whether it is possible to achieve our original objective. The accumulated evidence indicates we cannot. If this is correct it is in our national self-interest to seek ways and means of negotiating a constructive settlement. The President, of course, is in the best position to make the necessary tactical judgments to accomplish this end.

Whatever the final result in South Vietnam I think it is a necessary part of the educational process for us as Americans to recognize that in our relatively new role as leader of the free world we will be continually engaged in difficult risks and gambles in remote spots all over the globe. We will in the future as we have in the past take many risks in which the chances of success are much less than 50–50. The fact that we gamble in behalf of freedom some place and lose does not mean we should not have tried. If we never take any risks for fear of losing, we will never lose anything except our leadership of the free world.

Mr. President, I have in my hand a very thoughtful editorial published in the Milwaukee Journal. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEGOTIATE NOW IN VIETNAM

There is no future in what has been happening the last few days in Vietnam except the wider war that has been American policy and interest to avoid. As we retaliate against stronger Vietcong activity in South Vietnam with heavier and deeper aerial attacks upon North Vietnam, we extend an ever more pressing invitation for the Chinese Communists to intervene forcibly. To say that they will not do so is to forget that this country made just such a misjudgment in Korea.

The problem is not that we couldn't win a war against China. We have the power to do it. But for what purpose? It would involve us massively in a remote area of the world where our national interest and security are not involved in any paramount degree. It would risk the danger of nuclear war—for the Soviet Union, whatever its differences with China, could not long stand by without at least material aid to the Communist side.

The dangers are too great and the goals too unimportant for us to push on into full scale war. It is not as if we had allies of strong will and determination at our side. The South Vietnamese as a whole do not have their hearts in this enterprise. Our European allies do not believe that we belong in southeast Asia.

We are like a musclebound giant being besieged by gnats. We have overwhelming power but no way or reason to use it. The war is really a grueling ground action in the jungles and rice paddies.

Henry Cabot Lodge, former Ambassador to Vietnam, argues that retaliation against North Vietnam is proper when we are attacked but it cannot win the war. He thinks it is impossible to seal the borders of South Vietnam. He told U.S. News & World Report that "even if you had a 100-percent score in bombing supply lines I still don't think you could win this struggle in South Vietnam by just doing that."

Where do we go from here? Logically to a negotiated settlement. Lodge sees little possibility of this, but this country certainly should not be reluctant to say that it is ready to seek a settlement at the conference table. Nothing could be lost by recalling the Geneva pact powers for negotiation. President de Gaulle is right when he says that southeast Asia should be a neutral zone and that steps should be taken now to that end.

Certainly Russia wants no war. In all probability China doesn't, and North Vietnam certainly doesn't want Chinese soldiers in its territory. A negotiated peace is vital. It is the only alternative now to expanding war. And peace must remain our goal.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Senate and the entire Nation is indebted to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] for the high level foreign policy debate that he has introduced in the Senate today. The Senate has a constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy and in a dialog with the President of the United States. We violate not only our constitutional responsibility; but, beyond that, we jeopardize the national interest when we remain silent at a time of great significance to the Nation in terms of our relations with other countries.

I cannot think of any time in recent years when we have been confronted with more crucial changes in the field of foreign policy than we are at this very hour. The greatest disservice Senators could render to the President of the United States and to the country as a whole would be to remain silent at a time when we have an especially urgent re-

sponsibility to share our views and our convictions on important issues that might affect the future of our country and the peace of the world. So every citizen of our country is indebted to the Senator from Idaho, a thoughtful and realistic member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for giving us the benefit of his views today on important subjects affecting not only the continents of Africa and Asia, but also our own security. I commend him for that, and for many other helpful initiatives that he has taken in the field of foreign policy.

I say the same thing to the Senator from Wyoming, who has helped to conduct the debate and the dialog today in a constructive manner. We all look forward to his further remarks, as well as to the dissenting views that have been promised by the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], tomorrow. These differences of opinion and their expression on the floor of the Senate are helpful not only in clarifying our own views, but also in broadening the area of operations of our President at this very difficult time.

I wish to make it very clear that my position with regard to negotiation in South Vietnam is exactly the same, as I understand it, as the position of the Senator from Idaho. It has been interesting that this week the American people have indicated in a Gallup poll that by a margin of more than 60 percent they support the retaliatory air strikes ordered by the President. But those same people, less than 3 weeks ago, indicated by an amazing percentage of 81 percent that they also favor an initiative by the President of the United States in arranging a conference of southeast Asia, China, and other interested powers to see if some kind of a peace settlement can be worked out. Both those views reflect my own thinking, and they are not contradictory. It is perfectly possible to uphold the President's hand at a time when he is ordering selective air strikes in retaliation against attacks upon American forces, and at the same time to urge our President to use that high office in arranging a conference in which the possibilities of negotiation can be explored.

It is on that basis that I should like to take my stand today, as I did on the Senate floor a month ago and at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis last summer. Obviously, there is nothing contradictory about favoring decisive military action in Vietnam today at the same time that we hold open the door and in fact seek initiatives to bring about a conference to explore the possibilities of negotiation.

As the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] said, we cannot run out unilaterally on our commitment to the government of Saigon, to which we have pledged our continued support in that area. I could not agree with certain proposals that have been made, that we merely withdraw with no notice to the government of Saigon or to our allies. These are matters that have to be negotiated and discussed not only with the government of Saigon, but with other great powers that have an interest in this part of the world, and, of course, that includes the government of mainland China.

In the Gallup poll of January 31, the people were asked:

> Do you favor efforts by President Johnson to arrange a conference with leaders of southeast Asia, including China, to see if a peace agreement can be worked out?

It is interesting to me to observe that 81 percent of the American people said that that was what they favored. Eleven percent dissented. Eight percent had no opinion. I cannot recall any controversial foreign policy in recent years in which 81 percent of the people lined up on either side.

Public opinion expression ought to be considered carefully by our policymakers in the State Department and elsewhere throughout the Government.

President Johnson has consistently acted with restraint in Vietnam. He ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam only after careful consideration of all the factors involved in this complex crisis. The American people have demonstrated their support of the President's action.

But doubtless no one recognizes more clearly than the President that bombing attacks in the north will not solve the guerrilla struggle in the south. I hope that such tactics are aimed at increasing pressure on the North Vietnam Government and perhaps on the Chinese for negotiation rather than following the false hope that military victory is possible for either side.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CHURCH. I commend the Senator from South Dakota for the statement he is making. I associate myself with the remarks he has made with respect to the restraint that the President has shown in dealing with this dangerous, vexatious problem. All of us know that the problem has been long in the making. All of us understand the difficulty of the President's situation. But I am confident that the President is earnestly attempting to avoid a widening war in Asia. He remembers, as we all do, the experience in Korea. He remembers the statement of Gen. Douglas MacArthur afterward, warning against the endless attrition of sending American troops into battle on the Asian mainland. Therefore, I believe the President is endeavoring to find a way to reach a satisfactory settlement in southeast Asia that will not lead us into another Korean war.

I wish to be associated with the remarks the Senator has made with respect to the prudent restraint the President has attempted to use as he deals with this difficult problem.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Idaho for his comments.

This is the kind of struggle that is not affected much, if at all, by bombings a thousand miles away from the fighting. The guerrillas are largely equipped with American equipment that has been captured from the South Vietnamese, whom we have equipped. The guerrillas have demonstrated that they are capable of living off the countryside, with little outside support. The guerrilla strength is strongest a thousand miles away from the North Vietnam border. If the guerrillas do not always enjoy the cooperation of the general populace in South Vietnam, neither do they seem to encounter much grassroots resistance.

This is basically a political fight, as the Senator from Idaho has said, that in the long run will have to be settled by the Vietnamese people rather than by outsiders.

Unfortunately, our deepening military involvement in Vietnam, however well meaning—and our intentions were good when we became involved in this struggle some 11 years ago—has drawn to us much of the resentment which the Vietnamese developed over the years against France, Japan, and other intervening powers. Our military embrace of the South Vietnam rulers may actually have opened the way for Communist gains in southeast Asia and delayed the development of responsible government.

So however unfair it may seem to us, many of the same political factors that brought the French forces into disrepute and eventual defeat in southeast Asia are now operating against us. Those factors could not be controlled in the 1950's, even by an enormous investment of French military power, including 400,000 French soldiers.

The late beloved President Kennedy has been quoted several times on the floor of the Senate this afternoon. It is interesting, but perhaps somewhat ironical, that on April 6, 1954—almost 11 years ago—the then junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, took the floor of the Senate, at a time when the French had been fighting in the same area for some 8 years, and said:

> But to pour money, materiel, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive. Of course, all discussion of "united action" assumes the inevitability of such victory, but such assumptions are not unlike similar predictions of confidence which have lulled the American people for many years and which, if continued, would present an improper basis for determining the extent of American participation.

Then then Senator Kennedy continued:

> Moreover, without political independence for the associated states—

Meaning the states of Indochina—

> the other Asian nations have made it clear that they regard this as a war of colonialism and the "united action" which is said to be so desperately needed for victory in that area is likely to end up as unilateral action by our own country.

That is exactly what has happened. We are getting precious little help from any other country in the long, expensive, bloody struggle in southeast Asia.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield.

Mr. CHURCH. It would be well to contrast the situation that existed at the time of the Korean trouble with the nature of our involvement in South Vietnam today. In Korea, the invasion of the south by the north constituted

a clear violation of the peace system that the United Nations was established to maintain. The United Nations responded. The United States undertook to defend South Korea in the name of the United Nations, with the full support of world opinion and, indeed, with token forces contributed by a number of other nations.

True, the physical burden was largely ours; but the action was carried under the aegis of the world community. Today, owing to the different character of the war in South Vietnam, the world community does not look upon it as we do. Otherwise, we would probably be in South Vietnam today under the flag of the United Nations, with the active collaboration and support of other countries, and with the full approbation of world opinion.

The very difference in the situation bears out the position taken by the Senator from South Dakota in the excellent address that he is making on the floor of the Senate today.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the point of the Senator with reference to the Korean conflict and the contrast there is well taken. There is one further contrast to which he alluded in his remarks today. That is that whereas in Korea we had the support of our U.N. colleagues for our military involvement in this instance not only is such support absent, but we also have the leading officer of the United Nations, Secretary General U. Thant, urging the two sides of the Vietnamese conflict to get together and try to work out some kind of negotiated settlement.

There is one other lesson that we should remember about the Korean conflict. There are those who are willing to risk escalation on the theory that any amount of acceleration of the war on our part presents us with no real danger as far as Red China is concerned. These individuals glibly predict that a show of force on our part presents us with no threat of increasing Chinese involvement. They predict that somehow the Chinese will wander away if we just commit enough military power.

The lesson of Korea is that, if pushed far enough, we can indeed provoke hordes of Chinese soldiers to enter the conflict. The Chinese soldiers swarmed into Korea 1 million strong in 1951–52, which is the same kind of threat that is always present with reference to the very dangerous situation in southeast Asia. That is a lesson we ought not to forget.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. In the event that the war should continue in Vietnam without any recourse to the bargaining table, so that both sides would have to respond in terms of an ever higher level of military involvement, in addition to the prospect of a massive Chinese movement into southeast Asia, do we not also need to consider the increasing likelihood that China and the Soviet Union, under the pressure of this mounting war, would tend to be welded back together, so that the Communist world could present a united front against the United States?

This is a factor of enormous importance to the future of our relationship with the Soviet Union which needs to be weighed carefully in the balance as we decide how to proceed in Vietnam.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Senator has touched on one of the most fundamental questions in this whole crisis area. It would be the saddest of misfortunes if, at a time when the Communist world appears to be in disarray and the monolithic Communist bloc which once confronted us has been shattered, we were to provide through our actions the vehicle that united these very Communist governments. I can see that very thing happening in the event of an all-out war in southeast Asia. It would cause our Communist rivals to close ranks as nothing else could. Beyond that, we would have set back the cause of a detente of peaceful relationship of the kind that we hope has been developing between Red China and the Soviet Union.

I continue with two or three additional sentences from the speech delivered by Senator John F. Kennedy 11 years ago. Referring to the possibility of American intervention in southeast Asia, he said:

> Such intervention, without participation by the armed forces of the other nations of Asia, without the support of the great masses of the peoples of the associated states, with increasing reluctance and discouragement on the part of the French—and, I might add, with hordes of Chinese Communist troops poised just across the border in anticipation of our unilateral entry into their kind of battleground—such intervention would be virtually impossible in the type of military situation which prevails.

I shall read one final statement—and this is a most prophetic statement. It reads:

> Every year we are given three sets of assurances: first, that the independence of the associated states is now complete; second, that the independence of the associated states will soon be completed under steps now being undertaken; and, third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner, or lies 2 years off. But the stringent limitations upon the status of the associated states as sovereign states remain; and that the fact that military victory has not yet been achieved is largely the result of these prophecies has, however, in no way diminished the frequency of their reiteration, and they have caused this Nation to delay definite action until now the opportunity for any desirable solution may well be past.

Mr. President, it may very well be, 11 years later, that the opportune time for negotiations has been passed. But I do not believe so. The difference of opinion that the senior Senator from Idaho and I have with the Senator from Wyoming is that we think the time for the United States to explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement is now, before the forces are out of control and before a trend is started that might lead to world war III.

A month after the Senator from Massachusetts delivered that speech, with predictions of victory reverberating from the French, Dienbienphu took place. The French resistance collapsed, and the stage was set for a forced withdrawal of the French forces in Indochina. How ironical it is that more than a decade later, the same advice that we were giving the French in 1954 is now being given to us by President de Gaulle—that we cannot win a military victory, given the political conditions that exist in southeast Asia, that we cannot win when there is not a responsible political force in control in that part of the world, that guerrilla tactics of this kind do not lend themselves to a continued military solution, and that what is needed is a political settlement. Apparently the fight in southeast Asia has swung full cycle.

It is doubtful that our continued military involvement in the sixties will prove to be any more successful than the military involvement of the French was in 1954. We have already sacrificed over 300 American lives and $4 billion in the Vietnamese war. Perhaps that would not be too big a price to pay if we had been able to stabilize the political and military situation with that investment. But the facts are that both the political and military situations have worsened as we have become steadily more involved.

Far from losing face, I say that if we were to take the initiative in ending the fighting in southeast Asia now, it would reaffirm the fundamental desire of the American people for world peace. There is not any thought in the minds of the people around the world that is any more precious than the hope for peace. There is not any nation that would win any more prestige and support throughout the world than the nation that champions constructive steps in the cause of peace.

It is not appeasement to recognize that the problem of southeast Asia does not lend itself to a military solution. It is not appeasement for the mightiest military power in the history of the world to recognize the limits of that power and to commit it reasonably and wisely. Postitive steps toward peace will do more than retaliatory air strikes to replenish the reservoir of good will which is America's greatest source of strength in Asia and throughout the world.

It seems evident that neither we nor the other side can score a decisive victory in the kind of political guerilla war that has cursed Vietnam since the end of World War II.

The statement that we cannot score a decisive victory is balanced by the statement that neither can they have a decisive victory. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese have enormous land armies capable of holding out in the jungles for decades if they should ever be drawn on a large scale into the conflict in southeast Asia. U.S. military strength in the Far East, on the other hand, is largely naval and air power which does not lend itself to an Asiatic land war. We could pulverize the great cities of China and North Vietnam and still not end the guerilla warfare, or encourage the establishment of effective local government.

Although both sides will have to make concessions, both will stand to gain from a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Neither continued fighting nor negotiation can guarantee that governments in southeast Asia will be alined with the West. But it is not our mission to play policeman for the world. In the long run, only the people of southeast Asia can decide the political ideology under which they will live.

Even if one were to admit the danger of anti-Western governments coming to power in some of the southeast Asia states, it does not necessarily follow that those governments would be puppets of Red China. It is more than likely, given their historic resistance to China, that these states would resist Chinese encroachment with at least as much vigor as the states along the Soviet frontier in eastern Europe are now resisting Russian dictation.

Neither does it follow that American withdrawal from Vietnam means the end of our military power in Asia.

We hear rash predictions that the Communist takeover of southeast Asia means a series of domino incidents that will push us to Hawaii or California. But our real military power will remain in our naval air units offshore.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. Nothing has been said about the character of our problem in southeast Asia that so reflects how heat can be substituted for light than the notion that South Vietnam is the last stand for the United States beyond the shores of Hawaii, or even the gates of Seattle. If there is nothing but a vacuum between Saigon and Seattle, indeed we are in a perilous situation; but I had thought that the American Navy dominated the Pacific, and I had thought that the Pacific Ocean was a sizable moat to protect the security interests of the United States. We must try to view this situation in perspective if we are to do our duty.

Mr. McGOVERN. It is quite evident that the United States is and will remain for the foreseeable future, regardless of what happens in Vietnam, the strongest military power in the Pacific. We have the power to utterly devastate Red China, which hardly means that we would be negotiating from a position of weakness no matter what happens in Vietnam. No nation really believes that the United States is "a paper tiger", and no nation will believe any such nonsense should we try to negotiate a settlement in southeast Asia or should the South Vietnamese work out a settlement with the Vietcong on their own.

Indeed, it is quite possible, even probable, that we may have greater military, political, and economic flexibility and real power once we are free from entanglement in this costly and indecisive involvement in the jungles of southeast Asia.

Likewise, we can continue to play a strong political role in Asia by strengthening our relations with such key countries as Japan, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand. All of these countries plus the Russians and our European allies have an interest in joining with us to stabilize southeast Asia—perhaps with the aid of a significant United Nations presence.

If efforts at negotiation fail, and we have to continue the fighting we would have lost nothing of substance militarily, and our political position might be stronger. The American people are supporting the President's actions in Vietnam, but my mail indicates by a margin of 15 to 1 that the people also favor efforts on our part to negotiate a ceasefire and a settlement in Vietnam.

I have heard one of our commentators, sometime during the course of the day, make the statement that the mail coming to Members of Congress on this subject is Communist-inspired. I shall not take the time to read a long list of letters from people in my own State, from people who I know are good Americans, and from other States, letters from persons whose names are familiar to me, whose Americanism I do not question. I remind this commentator, who states that mail favoring negotiation efforts is Communist-inspired, that 81 percent of the American public favored a conference of the concerned nations. So it would be questioning the intelligence of the American people to say that 81 percent of them are being led around by the nose by Communist-inspired efforts.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator from South Dakota has been a leader in trying to make clear that statements made repeatedly by some persons who claim that some views which are controversial are Communist inspired, are not omniscient.

I know of nothing that could be more ridiculous than the charge that these letters were anything but sincere. If we wished to argue that the Communists were smart, we could argue that the Russians were writing these letters so that we would go to war against China in order to have us bogged down in the wrong place with the wrong country at the wrong time.

I commend the Senator from South Dakota for not refusing to let a few genuine, sincere Americans express what is in their hearts, and to take it as an honest expression of conviction, such as the kind of conviction reflected on the floor of the Senate in this discussion on both sides today, which is the only way we can arrive at what we hope will be rational and reasonable answers.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his helpful comments.

Mr. President, before I yield the floor, there are some articles I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following my remarks: Three columns written by Walter Lippmann, one dated February 11, 1964, one dated February 9, 1965, and a column published in Newsweek magazine on February 15, 1965; an editorial entitled "Errors on Vietnam," published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch; an article written by Joseph Kraft, entitled "Political Track Needed in Vietnam" and published in the Evening Star on February 12, 1965; an editorial published in the New York Times on February 11, 1965, entitled "Black Day in Vietnam"; an article written by James Reston, entitled "Washington: The Undeclared and Unexplained War," and published in the New York Times on February 14, 1965; together with the lead editorial published in the same issue of the New York Times entitled "Greatness by Restraint."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Sun-Times, Feb. 11, 1965]

UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT SHUN A PARLEY

(By Walter Lippmann)

WASHINGTON.—The reaction of the Red Chinese to our air strike is very interesting. The Peiping People's Daily is, as one might expect, very angry: "We are waiting for you in battle array * * * If you insist on imposing the war on us, heavy rebuffs are in store for you." There is little doubt about what the Peiping Chinese have in mind: They are thinking first of an American invasion on the ground into North Vietnam, and they are saying that if this occurs, they will intervene on the ground and give us a "heavy rebuff."

The important thing about this reaction is that it reveals how much the Chinese are land animals. It reveals a preoccupation with the only kind of war they are capable of fighting effectively, a war on the ground. There is no direct reaction to what actually happened—an air strike from carriers at sea.

But we must not assume from this that the Red Chinese regard themselves as incapable of fighting back. We must assume, on the contrary, that the Chinese military leaders, who have to be taken seriously, are considering how they can use the military instrument which they possess—land power—to answer the United States.

We must therefore reckon with the possibility that Chinese infantry might enter North Vietnam, perhaps also Laos and Thailand, and even Korea. This is likely to be the answer if the war is escalated to the point where North Vietnam is being devastated. The Chinese proved in the Korean war that their infantry cannot be stopped even by prolonged and continuous bombing. In the end, the Korean war had to be fought on the ground until it was settled by negotiation.

It is plain that time is running out for the policy which President Johnson worked out when he inherited the Vietnamese commitment. The policy was not to go north, as we have now done, and not to withdraw, but to stand pat and hope that our adversaries would grow tired of the war. It was a policy to postpone and avoid the necessity of making a decision—of choosing between widening the war and confronting China on the one hand, and on the other hand reviving the negotiations, which were never completed after the French defeat in 1954.

The choice is a horrid one. A war with China would be an incalculable risk. In a negotiated settlement, which would be followed by our withdrawal from the mainland, southeast Asia might slip within the Chinese sphere of influence unless the Soviet Union, Japan, India, and the United States were able to exert a countervailing influence.

The policy of avoiding a decision had a popular consensus behind it and it was useful in that it insulated the election from becoming a harum-scarum brawl about Vietnam. But desirable as the politics of consensus is for dealing with domestic issues, for pressing problems in the realm of great

power politics there must be a decision and choice.

The choice which has to be decided is between full-scale war and a negotiated truce. Mr. Johnson must not make the mistake of former President Harry S. Truman who let himself be persuaded by Gen. Douglas MacArthur that the Chinese would not be able to fight if we widened the war to their frontier on the Yalu River.

The military policy of holding on in South Vietnam, supplemented with retaliatory strikes, needs to be accompanied by a full-scale peace offensive. The United States ought not to be afraid to say and should not hesitate to say that it is seeking a negotiated settlement in southeast Asia. The peace offensive should be an appeal to the Russians, the Japanese, the Indians, the British, the French, and the Chinese to bring diplomacy to bear upon the warlike condition in Asia. The administration has always shrunk from talking about a negotiated peace.

But, as a matter of fact, the only rational objective of the policy we are following is to induce North Vietnam and its Chinese mentor to look to a negotiated settlement. Nobody in his right mind can imagine that this kind of war can be "won," that is to say ended by the unconditional surrender of the Communists. The administration has been willing to say privately that the reason we continue the war in South Vietnam is in order to put ourselves in a better bargaining position.

The retaliatory air strikes should help some. But the President's great predecessors, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, never thought that they could have a military solution without at the same time a diplomatic offensive.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 9, 1965]

THE VIETNAMESE AFFAIR

(By Walter Lippmann)

It is hard to believe that the raid on the American installations in South Vietnam was not closely related to Prime Minister Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam. It is hard to believe, too, that Mr. Kosygin would have picked the day after his arrival in Hanoi to touch off the raid. He was in no position to help the Vietcong to carry out the raid nor to protect North Vietnam against American retaliation. It is most probable, therefore, that the affair was ordered and directed by men who intended to spoil Mr. Kosygin's mission in southeast Asia and to interfere with his role as a principal power in bringing about a negotiated settlement.

Most probably, therefore, the gambit was directed both against the Soviet Union and the United States, which happen to have a parallel interest in preventing a big war in Eastern Asia and of containing the expansion of China. The administration is no doubt right in interpreting the raid on Pleiku as a test of American will. Had the United States refrained from retaliating, the Chinese and their supporters in Asia and elsewhere would have called it a demonstration that the United States is a paper tiger, and that therefore the Soviet policy of peaceable coexistence is unnecessary and absurd. The other side of the calculation was that if the United States reacted, as in fact it did react, it would demonstrate that in Asia the Soviet Union is a paper tiger unable to defend its clients.

From the Chinese point of view the gambit worked successfully. It showed, on the one hand, that the Americans are highly vulnerable on the ground in South Vietnam; it showed on the other hand that the Soviet Union has no power to protect East Asia against the United States.

Much depends on what lessons are drawn in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi and Washington from the affair.

We have had a very clear demonstration of the strategic reality in southeast Asia. The American Army at Pleiku was unable to protect itself against a comparatively small guerrilla attack, against a force estimated officially at about two squads and one platoon. The American forces got no warning of the attack from the Vietnamese people in the nearby hamlets where the raid was prepared. It got no protection from the Vietnamese security guards. In fact, when asked at his Sunday press conference whether the United States could not protect its own forces in South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara replied that he did not "believe it will ever be possible—and I think when I say this I reflect the views of our Joint Chiefs—to protect our forces against sneak attacks of that kind." Sneak attacks is in this case another name for guerrilla warfare.

But that is only half of the lesson which was demonstrated this past weekend. The other part of the lesson is that the U.S. fleet, standing a hundred miles offshore, is capable of inflicting devastating and unrequited damage on the Asian mainland. There was no power in South Vietnam to protect our own forces or to retaliate. But at sea there exists an enormous American power which is quite independent of our forces on the mainland.

The peace of the world may depend on whether all of the powers concerned take the meaning of these lessons to heart.

For us, the meaning is that the commitment to participate in the land war in South Vietnam is an entanglement, is a hostage to fortune, which exposes us to defeats and humiliations. The best that the more convinced believers in the commitment can say is that if we stay there long enough and accept the losses which they regard as tolerable, the Chinese and North Vietnamese will eventually grow tired and become indifferent. For myself, I would not count too much on American patience being greater than Chinese patience. It is less likely that the American people will wish to wash their hands of the whole business of containing China if they do not have to lose American soldiers week after week in a war that cannot be won on the ground where it is being fought.

The meaning of the affair must not be missed in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. Let them remember that, reduced to its fundamentals, the situation is that the United States possesses paramount sea and air power in the far Pacific, and no one can count on such a degree of restraint in the use of that power that it will never be used. The United States is not a paper tiger. That phrase reflects the greatest delusion on which our adversaries could possibly gamble. The truth is that President Johnson profoundly desires to avoid war but his power to do that is not unlimited nor can he be counted on not to be provoked if the provocation is continual and cumulative.

There should be no mistake about this anywhere.

[From Newsweek magazine, Feb. 15, 1965]

TOWARD PEACE IN ASIA

(By Walter Lippmann)

There are reasons for thinking that in east Asia, where the situation has been frozen for some years, there is again significant movement. In the postwar period after the American victory over Japan, there was a confrontation of power between the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the mainland Chinese on the other. This confrontation settled into a stalemate along the armistice lines in Korea, in the Taiwan Strait, and in southeast Asia. Neither the Korean war nor the war in southeast Asia has changed the main lines of this confrontation.

During the postwar years since the fall of Dienbienphu in 1954, the United States has been for all practical purposes the only great power opposing the two Communist powers on the Asian mainland.

The big change that is now taking place in east Asia is that other great powers, which have been absent for years, are returning to the region and are preparing to take part in the settlement of its affairs. Thus, within the past 2 years, we have seen India forced out of its neutral stance by a Chinese attack on its territory. There has been the return of France, which has important imponderable influence among the elite of Asia. Recently, there has been a cautious but unmistakable decision by Japan to have a say and to make herself heard. There is greater activity by Britain in response to Sukarno's threat to Malaysia. There is the decision to strengthen the military posture of Australia. And now, while this article is being written, the Soviet Union is returning to North Vietnam. For some years, in which the whole situation in southeast Asia has deteriorated, the Soviet Union has been absent.

The return of the powers to the Far East and the far Pacific is from our American point of view a promising development. It promises the end of our dangerous isolation in eastern Asia. It promises to release us from the solitary and thankless role of being the only country which has stuck its fingers in the holes of the dike containing Chinese communism.

UNIQUE POLICEMAN

We have tried to play this role during the whole postwar period, and we even went so far as to fight two inconclusive and depressing wars, one in Korea and one still going on in Indochina. But the event has shown that the role of the unique policeman in Asia was beyond our military reach and of our political experience, and we must, therefore, welcome the prospect, or at least the possibility, of sharing the burden with the powers which have greater interests in Asia than we have. These are chiefly Asian powers: Japan, India, and the Soviet Union. We shall not make the mistake, I feel sure, of looking upon their participation as an intrusion instead of a legitimate assertion of their national interests.

I do not think it is utopian to look forward to a day when all the interested powers will come together in a congress to work out the lines of an international order in Asia and the far Pacific. It is, however, probable that such a congress will be too cumbersome and too divided and too slow to deal with the worst trouble spots. I think we may, therefore, expect to see local arrangements for a cease-fire and for some cooperation. This may be what is in the making underneath the confusion in South Vietnam among the generals and the priests and the students—that is to say, a sorting out of the officials who will connive at, and perhaps encourage, peace arrangements with the Vietcong and with Hanoi.

STRONGEST POWER

The war party in this country thinks that the war in South Vietnam can be won by attacking North Vietnam, and quite possibly China as well. They will cry out that a breaking out of peace in Vietnam would be a gigantic American defeat which would compel an American retreat to the beaches of Hawaii.

It is not so. If the Vietnamese themselves make peace among themselves, we shall have honored our commitment and we shall, of course, withdraw our troops. But where shall we withdraw American power to? No farther away than the waters off the coast

of North Vietnam. We shall not withdraw from the area, and we shall not be immobilized and disarmed. We shall be just as dangerous to Hanoi as we are now, and freer to act when we are no longer entangled in the politics of Saigon and in the jungles of the country around it.

We should remember that the United States is indisputably the strongest power in the whole Pacific, and that this power will not disappear because of anything that happens on the mainland in South Vietnam. The brutal and basic facts of the balance of power in the Pacific are that the United States has the power to devastate China. On the other hand, China does not have the power even to scratch the United States.

That is a position of strength from which we need have no fear to negotiate.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch]

ERRORS ON VIETNAM

Former Vice President Nixon, who once urged massive military aid to save the French in Indochina, still clings to misconceptions about what is involved in the South Vietnam guerrilla war. Mr. Nixon, who represents a considerable body of public opinion, believes "we're losing the war in Vietnam and we will be thrown out of the country in a matter of months, certainly within a year."

To avert this calamity, he would use American sea and air power to "quarantine" the fighting. "People ask, 'What if China comes in?' I don't think so." Neutralizing South Vietnam would be "only surrendering on the installment plan," Mr. Nixon says.

Quarantine is a handy word. In the case of smallpox, the patient is isolated—which is not too difficult. But South Vietnam is in danger from interior rot as well as external aggression. And it is extremely doubtful whether the jungle trails could be cut by airpower. The United States is now stressing what it says is increasing infiltration from Communist North Vietnam into the south. But the figures are obtained from Vietnam intelligence sources. Are they credible?

Mr. Nixon does not think the Chinese would come in if the United States tried a quarantine. Better generals than Mr. Nixon, MacArthur for one, have been wrong about China. Even then, the idea misses the point. There has been an obvious tacit agreement between China and the United States not to expand the scope of the war; the same situation obtained in Korea. If either side wanted to escalate the struggle it could be done readily; but, for very good reasons, neither side does.

Would neutralizing South Vietnam be surrender on the installment plan? It would not be "surrender" on any plan. The United States contends it is in South Vietnam because the government (how many governments ago?) asked for help against Communist-led guerrillas. Actually, we are in South Vietnam because the late Secretary of State Dulles wanted to replace the beaten French in a vain effort to stem the tide of a native revolution. An honorable withdrawal would be correcting a mistake made a decade ago.

Mistake or not, we cannot of course just pick up and leave. That is why we ought to be actively seeking a way out instead of talking constantly as if there was nothing to do but muddle along spending $2 million a day and maintaining 20,000 advisers. It may be too late to bargain effectively for a settlement, but it is not too late to try. Mr. Nixon is quite right when he says we could be thrown out.

The latest coup, estimated to be the seventh since President Diem was assassinated 15 months ago, shows pretty clearly that, whatever the facade, there is nothing much left of the Saigon government except the military, and that is by no means cohesive. The military commander, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has become increasingly anti-American. The rank-and-file Vietnamese do not seem to care what happens; certainly they do not care as much as the Americans.

The United States cannot move in and take over, though the temptation may be great. That would substantiate charges of imperialism and colonialism, anathema in Asia. The truth is, if we could take a long view, that the white man is being forced out of Asia and Africa much as he forced his way in during the last four centuries. We should recognize the fact that we are on the losing end of a long historic struggle.

We should also begin to recognize that many nations of Asia and Africa are not presently up to Western-style democracy, and that the wave of the present is nationalism. If Indochina goes Communist, that does not mean it will become a colony of China. The people of Indochina want to be independent. We should be bending every diplomatic effort to help them. We will not do so by expanding the war, by quarantine, or by perpetual stalemate.

[From the (Washington, D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 12, 1965]

POLITICAL TRACK NEEDED IN VIETNAM

(By Joseph Kraft)

The immediate requirement in Vietnam is to edge events on to a political track. The present situation, dominated by the logic of military action and reaction, is dangerous and difficult to control.

The situation is dangerous because of the consequences of the bombing of North Vietnam. At best, the Hanoi regime is more than ever obliged to turn for support to Communist China. At worst, the Chinese will intervene directly in a major war on the ground. But the true purpose of the U.S. presence in South Vietnam is to check the spread of Chinese imperialism. Thus, the net effect of the bombings is to foster a result that goes against the grain of this country's strategic interest in Asia.

This country's global interest is not much better served. It lies in accommodation with the Russians, at least partially for the purpose of containing Peiping. But in the present climate of tension, it is hard for Washington and Moscow even to stay on speaking terms. If anything, the Russians are under pressure to throw in with Hanoi and Peiping in defense of the Communist interest.

The situation is difficult to control because there has been established a fusion between two things that are only indirectly related. On the one hand, there are the acts of the Vietcong, or Communist rebels, in South Vietnam. In response to their acts, the United States has twice bombed North Vietnam.

On the other hand, there is the infiltration of supplies and men from Hanoi to the Vietcong. This infiltration provides the rationale for hitting the north. In keeping with that rationale, retaliation has been directed against North Vietnamese training centers for the Vietcong.

No doubt, there is more than an innocent connection between the Hanoi government and the Vietcong guerrillas. But the two are not one and the same thing. To act as though they are is to place U.S. power in the hands of the least responsible party to the whole Vietnamese affair. As matters stand now, it is possible for a handful of Vietcong troublemakers, with a couple of well-placed grenades or plastic bombs, to unleash the might of U.S. sea and air power against North Vietnam.

A first step toward reasserting control is to wither the bond that has been set up between terrorism in the south and retaliation in the north. It may be, as Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has said, that there is no "absolute" defense against terrorist attacks. But vulnerability can be reduced.

Withdrawal of American dependents is one step in that direction. Concentration of U.S. forces in more easily defended installations would be another. Probably it would be a good idea for U.S. troops to assume the perimeter guard of major American installations. Perhaps additional ground forces should be sent for that purpose.

As to the infiltration from the north, it provides the handle for a political initiative. It is a clear violation of the 1954 Geneva accords. Washington has every right to refer the matter either to the United Nations or to the Geneva powers. Either of these bodies could generate enough diplomatic movement to justify an easing off of the military action.

If that seems like a pallid result, it is. No one should be under any illusion that an early settlement is in sight. For the minimal condition of a settlement is that it be underwritten by the United States and the Soviet Union. But the two big powers have almost no freedom of movement.

The United States cannot move toward agreement until the Saigon government shows the way. Otherwise, the President would be exposed to murderous political charges that he was selling out an ally.

Similarly, the Soviet Union cannot move without the approval of Hanoi. Otherwise the Russian leaders would be exposed to murderous political charges that they were selling out the revolution. For internal political reasons, in other words, each of the big powers is in bondage to its protege.

But the two proteges are now breathing fire. The Saigon regime, once moving toward a posture of negotiation, has been transformed by the recent events into a war government eager for adventures. And it was the Hanoi regime in the fullness of its wisdom, that initiated—just at the moment that events were moving toward negotiations—the intensification of the war.

In these circumstances, the best that can be hoped for now is a slow damping down of military activity. And even then, the outlook is for a long, long siege of trouble.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 11, 1965]

BLACK DAY IN VIETNAM

The slugging match in Vietnam continues; the war escalates; the danger grows; the goal of peace recedes. Just in 1 day—yesterday—many Americans were killed when an enlisted men's barracks was blown up by Vietcong terrorists, while in the north, in a pitched battle that began on Monday, Vietcong guerrillas wiped out five companies of South Vietnamese troops. Everybody concerned is braced for Washington's response, in accordance with the new policy of reprisals.

There is a frightening normality about the situation. Events are occurring with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy. President de Gaulle, who yesterday returned to his suggestion of another Geneva conference and a negotiated settlement, was right in saying that the war cannot be won no matter how much air and naval power the United States commits or what reprisals China may take. It cannot be won by any outsider, American or Chinese.

Washington evidently hopes that if North Vietnam is threatened enough or punished enough it will agree to a truce, Korean style; and then the United States will be in a position to negotiate peace or a controlled neutralization from a position of strength. The greatest weakness of this reprisal policy against North Vietnam is that while it is true the Vietcong gets orders, advice, some arms and some men from North Vietnam, the war is being fought in South Vietnam. That is where American lives were lost yesterday and where American trained and armed Vietnamese soldiers were defeated.

The Vietcong live and operate in South Vietnam, using American arms captured from the Vietnamese. The peasants either help them, or accept them, or are cowed into submission by them. The guerrillas, as Vietminh against the French a few years ago, or as Vietcong today, have been fighting for two decades. They are tough, dedicated, fanatical, well trained. Perhaps they are not winning, but certainly they are not losing. Meanwhile, each day that passes gives further evidence of the relentless escalation of the conflict.

This is what gives special point to President de Gaulle's renewed suggestion to recall the 14-nation Geneva conference to seek an "international accord excluding all foreign intervention" in southeast Asia. The key factor in the De Gaulle proposal—and the main stumbling block for the United States—is that no conference and no settlement is possible in that region without the participation of Communist China. Whether we like it or not—and we do not like it—Communist China is an interested party; and the United States knows of course that North Vietnam cannot be bombed as if Communist China did not exist.

There may still be a choice: talk or fight. If everybody waits too long, the chance to talk will be gone.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 14, 1965]

WASHINGTON: THE UNDECLARED AND UNEXPLAINED WAR

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 13.—The time has come to call a spade a bloody shovel. This country is in an undeclared and unexplained war in Vietnam. Our masters have a lot of long and fancy names for it, like escalation and retaliation, but it is war just the same.

The cause of the war is plain enough. The North Vietnamese Communists, with the aid of Red China and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, have sent their guerrillas into South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, for the express purpose of taking over the Government and territory of South Vietnam.

AMERICA'S RESPONSE

The course of the war is equally plain. We were getting licked in South Vietnam. The Communists were steadily defeating the South Vietnamese armed forces, terrorizing a war-weary and indifferent population, and taking advantage of a divided and quarrelsome South Vietnamese Government.

More than that, the Communists were stepping up their attacks on the bases and barracks which serve the 23,000 American troops in South Vietnam, and it was in response to this that President Johnson ordered the bombing attacks on the Communist military installations in the south of North Vietnamese territory.

Very few people here question the necessity for a limited expansion of the war by U.S. bombers into Communist territory. The American and South Vietnamese position was crumbling fast, and the political and strategic consequences of defeat would have been serious for the free world all over Asia.

There is a point, however, where this exercise will become critical. As the military targets in the southern part of Communist Vietnam are knocked out, and our bombers move northward, they will soon come within the range of the North Vietnamese and Red Chinese MIG fighters, and if we get into that situation, the pressure for attacks on the air bases in North Vietnam and South China will steeply increase.

The immediate problem, therefore, is how to put enough pressure on the North Vietnamese to bring them into negotiations for a settlement of the war, without provoking a mass Communist counterattack we are in no position to meet.

This is a delicate and highly dangerous situation. The United States has the air and naval power to wipe out North Vietnam and the Chinese Air Force if it comes into the battle. But the North Vietnamese have a quarter of a million men under arms who have never been committed to the battle at all, and few observers in Washington believe this force could be stopped without the intervention of a very large American Army on the ground.

THE SILENT WHITE HOUSE

Nobody has made all this clear to the American people. President Johnson has not made a major speech on the details of this war since he entered the White House. Neither did President Kennedy. We have had one long speech on the subject by Secretary of Defense McNamara on March 26 of last year, and a lot of statements here and in Saigon, many of them highly optimistic and misleading. But the fact is that we are in a war that is not only undeclared and unexplained, but that has not even been widely debated in the Congress or the country.

The whole history of this century testifies to the difficulty of predicting the consequences of war. We imposed a policy of unconditional surrender on the kaiser only to find that the two greater menaces of communism and nazism took his place. One of the main objectives of the two World Wars was the freedom of Eastern Europe, which ended up with less freedom under the Communists than it had before.

LIMITING THE WAR

Few people here question that President Johnson wants to limit the war in Vietnam and avoid a ground war on the continent of Asia, but the future is not wholly in his control. He may be bombing merely to force a negotiated settlement, but the Chinese and the North Vietnamese don't know that. In fact neither do the American people, whose airmen are carrying out the President's orders.

Nor, for that matter, do the allies, who are treaty-bound to support us if we get into a larger war in southeast Asia. They will undoubtedly support a policy of limited retaliation in North Vietnam if it is for the purpose of negotiating a settlement, but they will not support us for long unless we define and limit our aims.

The implications of this war, then, extend far beyond Vietnam. President Johnson's hopes of building a strong alliance with Japan and the other free nations of Asia are not likely to be promoted by replaying the old script of American planes once more bombing Asians.

He has started on a massive program of reconstruction and development at home, but he can forget about his Great Society if he gets bogged down in a major land war in Asia on territory favorable to the enemy. Freedom expands in peace and authoritarian government in war, and this is precisely the danger now, for the Communists have the manpower to cause us an almost unmanageable situation not only in Vietnam but in Korea, and force us into a war that could divert our energies from the larger constructive purposes of the Nation.

In this situation it is difficult to understand why the problem is not discussed more openly by the President, why the terms of an honorable settlement are not defined, and why the negotiating efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations and other world statesmen are so blithely brushed aside.

It is true that the instability, weakness, and sensitivities of the South Vietnamese Government have to be kept in mind, but nobody is suggesting a sellout at their expense. The talk here is not about a Munich agreement but a Korean agreement in which South Vietnam, like South Korea, would be in a better position to order its own life.

This would not be ideal, but it would be better for the South Vietnamese and for the United States than what we have now, and it would be better for North Vietnam and China than a larger war.

CHINA'S DANGER

For if this dangerous game gets out of hand, it is not likely that China's new industries, including her atomic installations at Taklamakan Desert in Central Sinkiang, will be spared. What her manpower can grab beyond her borders would be worth far less than what she would lose at home.

Somebody, however, has to make a move to reverse the trend and stop the present crooked course. For the moment, we seem to be standing mute in Washington, paralyzed before a great issue, and merely digging our thought deeper into the accustomed military rut.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 14, 1965]

GREATNESS BY RESTRAINT

Escalation of the war in Vietnam, such as took place last week, has led the United States to the entrance of a one-way street. If followed to the bitter end, this road could lead to a major war involving Communist China and probably the Soviet Union. But there is still time to stop.

A great power can demonstrate its greatness by its restraint. The United States has the air and naval power to destroy everything of importance in North Vietnam; but this country would show itself to be far wiser and far stronger by refraining from doing so than by pursuing a policy of repetitive retaliation, which is at once so seductive and so dangerous. Despite the administration's oft-restated desire "to avoid spreading the conflict," this present policy of reprisals is inexorably carrying the United States into a major armed struggle in southeast Asia—unless a halt is called, and soon.

When President Johnson ordered last Sunday's retaliatory strike after the Vietcong attack on Pleiku, there was understanding and support for his action. Yet, it was recognized that the two actions—the assault on a U.S. military installation in South Vietnam and the American decision to respond by striking at staging areas in North Vietnam—vastly increased the perils to world peace that have always been inherent in the Vietnamese conflict.

Now each side feels obliged to match a show of power by the other with an even greater response—a course that can only invite holocaust. For the United States the problem, is made severer by the impossibility of striking effectively at the Vietcong without carrying the war into North Vietnam and thus intensifying the pressure on Peiping and Moscow to become actively involved.

President Johnson is up against his greatest foreign policy test. Surely he knows that the complex problems of Vietnam and southeast Asia cannot be settled by arms alone. An infinity of social, political, economic, religious, tribal, nationalistic, historic, and traditional factors are at work in Vietnam. This country can best demonstrate its wisdom and responsibility by keeping its powder dry and meanwhile trying patience, diplomacy, and negotiation.

History, good intentions, and a concatenation of events have led the United States into a morass where we sink deeper each day. The Vietnamese conflict should not be almost exclusively a U.S. burden. The Russians have good reasons to want peace in Vietnam. The French want to bring about an international conference. So does United Nations Secretary General Thant. The Chinese would probably refuse to attend one or even to compromise; but nobody will know unless a conference is tried.

What the United States is now doing in Vietnam is playing directly into the hands or Communist China by taking actions that—

however defensive in intent—lead to a steadily escalating, and hence more dangerous, conflict. This, surely, is the last thing in the world that the Johnson administration and the American people want. Therefore something else should be tried, and this something has to be negotiation with all parties concerned.

The United States has made its point very forcefully with bombs during the last week. Its power is indisputable. In the light of the strength this country has shown, it can now offer to continue the argument over a conference table where its power will be undiminished. But the outcome might then be peace instead of war.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from South Dakota on an extremely fine statement. It is a viewpoint in which I heartily concur. I am reassured in that position by the able argument the Senator from South Dakota has just made.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I address myself to the central question that has been developed in such a fascinating and enlightening way on the floor of the Senate today on the part of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN]. I stand in their debt for the insight which they have displayed on this tortuous and difficult problem.

None of us would contend that we have the absolute answers. None of us contend that we know what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month, or next year; but we do have the obligation—and that is why we are here—to try to make an educated guess, and to take a reasonable and rational position, policywise, in the interests of our country and of the great cause which all Senators represent.

Mr. President, the question has repeatedly arisen, Why not negotiate now? The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] has repeated it: Why not try it now? What would we lose?

If it fails, I will tell Senators what we shall lose. If it fails, at this very moment the men in Hanoi, the men in Peiping still—we are told—are convinced not that we are a "paper tiger," but that we are tired, that we are going home, that we are frustrated, that we are fed up, that if we were to propose now, in the wake of the assaults on American billets, the attacks on American airfields, and in the destruction of heavy concentrations of American military capability, that what we wish to do now is to sit down and talk about it, what would one conclude if he were in Hanoi? What would one conclude if he were in Peiping?

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield at that point?

Mr. McGEE. If I may finish my thought at this moment, then I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

We are risking the Chinese and the Vietcong jumping to the wrong conclusion. My concern today, and the concern of a good many of us, is that the men in Hanoi will make the wrong decision for the wrong reasons—and that is why I speak here today. I believe that we can time the proposal more advantageously than at the present moment. The suggestion that I am going to make as a topic for discussion in just a moment would spell out one way I believe it might be brought about, because I agree that it ultimately must lead to negotiation; but I believe that it is imperative that we get through loud and clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we are not fooling, that we are not tired, that we are not about to go home. Yet their every move made with impunity, such as those of the past few days, was obviously calculated with a sense of arrogant confidence that by turning up the "heat" they could put enough pressure on the Americans to let up a little bit or even, perhaps, to sit down and talk, while the cards held by North Vietnam and the Chinese, who are "kibitzing" over their shoulders, are the strongest cards they have held in many years.

I would be the last to try to argue that we would have to retreat from this area to Hawaii or Alaska. We all know the reality of American power. As our President has stated again and again, we intend to do what is right in Vietnam. We are not about to run. My own misgiving is that those on the other side of the line are not so persuaded. What they believe we are about to do, and what they calculate our policy may be, will determine their decision rather than what you and I, Mr. President, know we are going to do.

For that reason, it seems to me we have to make it unalterably clear, in language that the man in Hanoi can understand, that this is no joke, that this is no play that we are acting out in Vietnam.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?

Mr. McGEE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I believe, too, that it is very important that the Communist government in Hanoi does not miscalculate American objectives or American stamina. I do not see, however, that anything we have done since the Second World War furnishes any basis for Hanoi, Peiping, or Moscow to conclude that the United States does not stand fast. We have been standing fast all over the world.

We stood fast in Berlin, we stood fast in Cuba—when the whole world was threatened with nuclear incineration. There is certainly nothing in the American postwar role to suggest to the Communists that we are either tired of fulfilling our commitments to Saigon, or that we will withdraw from South Vietnam under mounting Communist pressure.

I do not believe that Peiping is apt to make this miscalculation, as they are apt to conclude that there is no alternative, by virtue of the rising tempo of sustained and systematic bombing attacks, unaccompanied by any indication of willingness to parley, to repeating what was done in Korea, moving down massive Chinese manpower. This would lead to a very great and costly war, which, in the end, would bring us finally to the bargaining table anyway.

As between the two miscalculations, I believe history will bear witness to the Chinese response to American military action in Korea. I would not like to see that development take place in South Vietnam if we can avoid it.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's comment, and the articulate way in which he has refined the line which is the demarcation line between his proposal and mine.

As he has referred to the record of history, perhaps I will be permitted to do so as well.

There comes to mind what Lord Palmerston said when he was the head of the British Government more than a hundred years ago. He said it was easy to calculate the nature of Russian policy. He said it is a sprawling giant that continually reaches out to its own periphery, probing the entire fringe for a weakness, ever pressing outward. Where it is not resisted, it breaks through and extends its territorial holdings. However, where it is resisted—and this is important—it pulls back, to bide its time until perhaps the resistor will be tired of resisting, and perhaps relax. At that time the probing resumes, in the hope of breaking through where there had been earlier resistance by someone guarding the other side of the frontier.

That policy has characterized many of the crises that we have survived so successfully up to now in the 20 years of the cold war; but the only difference now is that the same sort of thing has shifted to another quarter of the globe and that the emphasis has been played down in Moscow and is now being played up in Peiping, but it is the same policy nonetheless.

Mr. President, those men have never gotten out of the notion that we will not see it through. They have the parallel of World War II. We went home much sooner then than this time. This time we have changed the parallel. We have learned the lesson of 1918. However, the fact remains that those men read American history. Of course, sometimes they read only what they want to read, but it is understandable that Asians still believe that we will grow tired and go away. When I say that, I need not remind the distinguished Senator from Idaho and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], now occupying the Presiding Officer's chair, that even our friends in Europe entertain such misgivings. One of the almost regular concepts that worries them, that gives them unrest, is the fact that if the Americans do not go home in the first 10 years, they are sure to go home in the second 10 years.

I doubt that in the history of our time, at least, there will ever be a moment in the struggle when we will dare go home. I am afraid that times will compel us to man the ramparts, the frontiers of power politics all around the globe for the foreseeable future.

That is not what the men in Hanoi and the men in Peiping are counting on. They are confident that we will pack up our tents and leave. They want to find out whether this is the time. That is why they are sticking their fingers into Vietnam right now. I personally do not believe they intend this to be the ultimate showdown, but I think they are trying to take a reading on our intentions.

I repeat, given the Communist mind and given the mystery of what we read in the newspapers, and the debates on the floor of the Senate—and we often find it difficult to understand each other—it does not require much imagination to understand that some of the men in Hanoi may not be getting the message loud and clear from Washington. That is the basis of my concern.

Before I again yield to the Senator from Idaho, let me spell out the steps that I should like to discuss for a moment.

First of all, I believe we must announce and make it irrefutably clear that we draw a firm line along the 17th parallel—separating North Vietnam from South Vietnam; that we make it clear that we intend to tolerate no breaches of that line; that we do not intend to negotiate violations of the line; and that we do not intend to negotiate the infiltration of hordes of highly trained North Vietnamese troops.

I do not share the feeling of the Senator from Idaho that the great advantage of military strength lies in Saigon or lies in South Vietnam, because the very nature of the tactic that has been resorted to by North Vietnam plays to their advantage, not to that of South Vietnam.

Our experiences in guerrilla warfare, the experiences in Malaya, and the experiences now confirmed in Vietnam indicate that for every single enemy guerrilla in the field, we had better have 10 or 20 highly trained armed personnel if we are to have a chance of coming out even.

That means that when 1,000 troops come over the border from the north, it requires a full division to match them. I believe that at this point we must draw this line.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. I should like to finish the four or five steps that we can take, to put this subject in a context in which the Senator may raise the question he is about to ask me.

I say that in explanation of the need, as I see it, for drawing a firm line, for making a very strong statement that we shall tolerate no infiltration across that line, beginning whenever the wisdom of the President dictates, say, on Tuesday morning—to pull a date out of the hat.

Second, if after this deadline—and it is an ultimatum—the infiltration is still underway, and there is still a flagrant abuse of that line separating the two parts of Vietnam, then it would be announced that if it continues we will bomb the airfields and the marshaling stations; in other words, active military compounds in North Vietnam.

Then, if the men in Hanoi believe that we are still bluffing and the message still has not gotten through—I think it will get through—and if for any reason they doubt our sincerity, we should announce that we will step up the bombardment, and that we will then attack the logistical communication lines of their military effort.

That means we would bomb the bridges, the roads, and the rails—though the rails exist only in limited amounts.

Finally we would or should propose that should they still persist in running troops into the south across the 17th parallel, then, and then only, would we attack the industrial sectors and the supply bases for the military effort within North Vietnam. As we would do that, as we would spell out that action at the identical moment and all in a carefully calculated timetable so that the whole picture is available for study by the men in Hanoi, I believe it is important that we should make very clear that we desire nothing from them. We do not want their country. We do not want their Government. We have no territorial ambitions in North Vietnam or, indeed, in all of Asia; but we desire to start by respecting the 17th parallel, which currently—theoretically, at least—separates the two parts of the country.

In my judgment, that series of steps ought to precede any exploration for a discussion of the situation in Vietnam. I spell it out that far for the reason that I believe there is a serious question of doubt that those on the other side really believe that we mean business—not for want of power, but because they are convinced that we do not have the will to use it to the ultimate. That is the kind of test that we shall have to run through in order to make abundantly clear our intentions.

Mr. President, the question is raised, What will Hanoi do? Suppose they do not stop them?

First, I think Hanoi is probably as jittery about being occupied by China as most of the other countries of southeast Asia. Thus, there is some element present that may inhibit the kind of decision they would like to make. But still we must face the ultimate question, and that is, What will China do? Is such an approach enough to provoke China into the big war?

I do not know whether that it will or not. I do not know what China would do. I do not know anyone who can say with assurance that he knows what China would do. The only man who believed he knew for sure what the Chinese would do was proved dead wrong in Korea.

But I think it is time to find out what China would do. For that reason the proposed approach has the advantage of measuring Chinese intentions now. Most observers guess that China is not quite willing to risk her 2½ million or 3 millon highly trained troops in the south in a gamble to seize the rich empire that has attracted the great colonial nations of the earlier centuries and has attracted empire builders as recently as Japan in 1941.

But even if we assume the worst—and in any kind of projection, while we hope for the best, we must prepare for the worst—if China were to decide that this was the price she had to pay and she should pay it now, then I say, as ugly and as frightening as that would be, it is better that we face it now than it is that we fritter away our present position piecemeal to a later time in the world of the future when the cost may be considerably different and the prospects of a successful turn much more dim indeed.

I hope it will not be interpreted wrongly if I were to suggest that the hope that may be expressed and is expressed daily in the press by some, that China really will not be up to anything very serious, reminds us of the speculation that went on about what Mr. Hitler might do, or what Mr. Mussolini might or might not do, in the time previous to World War II.

I do believe that something surrounding the approach that I have suggested would give us a clearer view of the picture, would give the other side a clearer view of our intentions, and would likewise strengthen the American hand for a meaningful discussion of how we should best resolve these tortuous issues that so dominate our concern now and probably will continue to dominate it for many, many years to come.

I should be glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho at this point.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I have listened with great interest to the proposals of the Senator from Wyoming. I comment only that if our purpose—and, here again, we get back to the question of what it is—that if our purpose is to cause the North Vietnamese to give up their interest in the war that the Vietcong is waging against the Saigon Government, I would forecast right now that they will not do it. They have been engaged for many years in their revolution, first, to throw out the French. It is said that even President Eisenhower, at the time of the French defeat, was persuaded that an election in Vietnam would have gone overwhelmingly in favor of Ho-Chi-Minh.

The ambition of Hanoi is to reunite the country. Therefore, if our purpose is to seal off the borders so as to guarantine South Vietnam from further pressure or activity on the part of the Communists, we might as well know right now that this will not happen.

I have no confidence that bombing would make it happen. We bombed North Korea. We bombed it in an effort to break the fighting will of the Communists there—the most thorough bombing, perhaps, that has ever taken place in history. We bombed their roads; we bombed their buildings; we bombed their bridges; we bombed their industry. We leveled and flattened North Korea. But we never broke the Communist will to fight. They never called off the war, and in the end we had to bargain for a truce that represented no complete victory for either side.

I merely suggest that, in the light of our experience, bombing won't break the spirit of North Vietnam either. Therefore, I have little confidence that such action would lead to the surrender by the North Vietnamese, of their interest in the unification of the country, or their pursuit of what they regard as an unfulfilled war for independence. If Korea is any basis for comparison, and if the long, long struggle that these people have engaged upon is any indication of their resolution, then our bombings will not break their spirit or solve our problem.

The Senator is calling on them to quit and accept defeat, total and complete, in the matter of South Vietnam, as the condition for further talks. If that could be accomplished, there would be no occasion for further talks. Perhaps it could be accomplished with the involvement of large American land forces. Thus far, a ratio of 4 to 1 in favor of the South Vietnamese has not enabled that government to seal off its borders. The best information we have received is that it is even doubtful this could be accomplished by American combat troops, given the jungle nature of the terrain. Perhaps four or five American divisions, committed to the war, could seal off this boundary, and as long as we kept our troops there, we could maintain that position.

There are other difficulties with laying down, as a precondition to negotiations, the requirement that infiltration stop. How can we tell whether it has stopped? How can we know whether, if they stopped today, they would not start again tomorrow? These are serious problems, when combined with the nature of the terrain and the similarity of the people on both sides.

Mr. McGEE. First, we should not have as our primary target the long-range ambitions of North Vietnam. That is a civil war condition that the Vietnamese alone must resolve. That is a civil war condition which has created weakness in South Vietnam that is exploited by Peiping or Moscow in an attempt to provide an opportunity for a breakthrough.

But I believe the Senator from Idaho would agree with me that we know a great deal more about what is taking place on the part of the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam—how many men are getting into South Vietnam, how they are getting there, what they take with them, where they get it, and who is directing them. These are well known matter that sometimes are paraded promiscuously on the pages of the press. The difficulty is not quite so insuperable as the Senator suggests.

No one knows better than he and I what a difficult task it is to wage any kind of offensive against guerrilla combat. He and I together watched from helicopters. We know how uncertain it is to spot enemy troops that are pitter-pattering down some jungle trail, their activity quite obscured by foliage or darkness. But with the kind of organization we have, we know also that it is possible to make rather realistic assessments.

We have been talking in specific terms, publicly, about the number of first-rate North Vietnamese troops that have been used in the past few months; as contrasted with the kind of troops that were already there, made up of those unhappy with the Saigon government. So it would be impractical to dismiss the feasibility of a day-to-day measurement of the kind of help that is coming from North Vietnam.

What we are trying to do is to stabilize the frontier, to stabilize a weakness in an area of the world that has remained for a long time in a state of flux. Once that stability comes, as it did in Korea, as it did in Berlin, as it did in West Germany, it will open up the widest spectrum of possibilities and meaningful discussions about reuniting an area that has an obvious common denominator.

Some think there may be a united Korea. We need not stop thinking about that possibility, even though a line has been drawn at the 35th parallel.

There is still much talk of uniting the two Berlins, as there is about uniting the two Germanys.

I submit that while we have been living with the hard facts of these divided entities, they offer a reasonable prospect for stabilizing the area.

The changing conditions of the times in which we live should lead us to take continuous readings on one of the best prospects for using discussions or negotiations, or whatever the method may be.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator from Wyoming has made an excellent contribution to the discussion of this problem today. My difference with him is that I would leave it to the President to set the conditions which would lead us to the conference table. I should think that if we were to insist upon a cordon sanitaire that was at all meaningful, separating the north from the south, before we were willing to talk, we should also insist upon a cease fire in South Vietnam by the Vietcong rebels, and thus accomplish essentially, prior to negotiation, the very ends we have sought in assisting the Saigon Government in the first place.

I suggest that such conditions may not be realistic if our purpose is to go to the bargaining table. If our purpose is to cut off the North Vietnamese and to maintain an impregnable 17th parallel, we shall find that this will have to be done with American troops, as we found in Korea. As the Senator knows, 12 years after the Korean fighting stopped, more than 50,000 American troops are still in Korea, and South Korea continues to be attached to us for rations to the tune of about half a billion dollars a year.

However, I feel certain that if the President undertakes to go to the bargaining table in southeast Asia, he will first set the conditions under which he will be willing to explore a settlement there. How those conditions may vary from the ones the Senator from Wyoming is now proposing, time will tell.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator. I reiterate that I am mindful of the fact that the distinguished Senator from Idaho and the present presiding officer have another very important engagement. I am afraid that I am imprisoning them by the fact that I am the only other Senator left here at this moment.

Both the Senator from South Dakota and the Senator from Idaho have continually referred to the fact that the old domino theory no longer obtains in this situation. If we are willing to accept the statement that it no longer obtains, it is a little easier to understand how they can proceed to jump to the conclusion that they can risk a negotiation at this particular moment. But I strongly deny such an assumption.

It is my judgment that the domino theory is valid at the present moment. And it would be inconceivable to me that if there were to be a weakening of our position in south Asia and Americans were to even indicate an intention to pull off from the shore and watch over the situation like a big brother from our aircraft carriers, it would not bring great consternation to Bangkok, which the Communists in the north have already said is their next objective, and in which country they are mobilizing their next campaign in the northeast provinces at this moment.

Would it not be wiser for Bangkok to read the writing on the wall and say, "Perhaps we had better do something. Let us reach an accommodation with China." The same thing is true of Malaysia, and Kuala Lumpur. They are having trouble there which is instigated by the Chinese.

How much longer could a government in Kuala Lumpur hold on? What inspiration would they have to hold on if they were to see the forces that have been their shield of that section of the world pull off into the Pacific and the China Sea?

We have learned more recently that there is new activity and more dissident groups in the Philippines. It has reached a crescendo such as they have not known there in the past 8 or 10 years. Those people are on the move. And with all of our misgivings about Mr. Sukarno in Indonesia, there would be no slight inducement for any group in Indonesia to take a second look at their proximity to Communist China if we were to pull out.

I am only saying that we should not write off the so-called old-fashioned domino theory. Call it by some other name, but the fact remains that if Vietnam goes, Cambodia goes, Thailand goes, Malaysia goes, Indonesia goes, the Philippines go. This is only the proverbal camel's nose in the tent.

The real target of the Communist Chinese, as we all know, is the great underbelly of Asia, the Indian subcontinent. That is why I think we need to take a cold and hard, but rational look at what is really at stake in our position in southeast Asia.

In my judgment, a larger American commitment in southeast Asia may be required. It may take more troops. I do not know. I cannot know now. But, there are those who will have to make that decision. It may take more money. Who knows?

I am only saying that in the context of the history of the cold war, we have proved that when the chips are down in the critical crisis points around the globe, we are willing to risk everything in order to stand tall. And this has been the policy that Moscow understood. It is a policy that even the Chinese might understand. We have invested too much—we have risked too much until now to fritter it away with indecision at this moment, for fully as much rests on the right decision in Vietnam as rested on the right decision in Greece, Berlin, Germany, or Korea.

That is the reason, it seems to me, that we may even reach the point at which

the President, speaking for all of us, may have to spell this out very carefully on a great public occasion. That would be an address not only to our own people, but also to the people of the world in which he would make it abundantly clear that we are not about to forfeit what we have already invested, including so much of our treasure and so many of our lives, by looking for an easy, bargain-basement way out of a tough situation.

I repeat that in the opening of the colloquy with the Senator from Idaho some time ago, what we strive for now is not a free government in Vietnam, not democracy. Those are a long way off. We are there to try to win the chance for such a future in that area.

The price we have already paid for that chance ought to haunt us every night. And what we do with that chance will determine the course of the history of our time.

Mr. President, I oppose negotiations over Vietnam now. There is no reason to believe that negotiations would in any way strengthen or in other ways improve the position of the free world in that critical quarter of the globe. Do not mistake me. I believe that some time there must be neogtiations. In these talks we should lead from strength, not from weakness. We should be prepared to define in specific terms our aims and our goals in Asia. In short, we must set our united effort now to preparing the way for ultimate negotiations.

Why not now? Many factors should persuade us to work toward a better moment to negotiate—a moment which we can predetermine and whose dimensions we can define. As the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] has so correctly put it, we have great bargaining position at our command. Unfortunately, however, we have not deployed those advantages as skillfully as we might. A cursory glance at the confusion in Indochina which now surrounds our presence there ought to be sufficient to prove the point. Our own stance is caught in the crossfire between the determination to stop military penetration from the north and civil disobedience from the south. It is caught between the contradictions of guerrilla infiltration in the geographical interior on the one hand, and the moral and spiritual human interior on the other. At this very moment we witness—after an expenditure both in material and in lives—an actual intensification of the agression from the north. More than ever before in the tortuous years of fighting in southeast Asia, the tune to which the guerrillas dance is being played in Hanoi. And the tactical plays to which they are resorting in their mounting program of harassment are being quarterbacked from the same source. It is not without point that recent word coming out of both Hanoi and Peiping represents the two capitals as boasting with confidence that the American presence in southeast Asia is nearing its end. Some few have even gone so far as to flatly forecast that the U.S. Army will be out of Vietnam within a year, or at most 2 years.

Thus, with American billets being blown up, American airstrips being heavily damaged by mortar fire, with the infiltration of American positions being accelerated in spite of a deployment of increasing numbers of American troops, it can hardly be argued that we have thus won a position of strength from which we can advantageously negotiate a settlement in the East.

I fully appreciate the mood of the people of America at this moment as many of them seem to be saying, "Let's have another look and find a graceful way out." Like the distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN], I, too, have received a volume of mail advocating just that. But may I respectfully submit, this is no time to be taking polls or putting our political fingers in the wind in order to determine which direction we ought to go. One has to hark back only 30 years in our country's recent past to recall another time when we tried desperately to reason ourselves out of the necessity for stopping Hitler and Mussolini. In those years, sincere and honorable leaders of our country played upon the mounting hopes for peace as reflected in the public mind. In hindsight, however, we can see that too many people in those days preferred wishful thinking about peace to realistic thinking about war. And while our current debates on policy in Vietnam are dotted with protestations of faith in the international role of our country and of denials that anyone is returning to the old isolationism, may I submit that in the decade of the 1960's the new isolationism; namely, that of quitting the job of rebalancing the world before the task is completed, could be just as disastrous as the old isolationism of the 1930's. Some of the greatest and most respected voices in this body are being raised in that category. I believe they are wrong and that history will prove them wrong.

Unfortunately, the isolationists of World War II were never really defeated. They only went underground. Even now their heads are popping up once again. But now their ranks are being joined by others who are understandably impatient, frustrated, or just plain fed up with the sequence of crises along the frontiers of the world. This resurgent new isolationism of the 1960's jeopardizes the prospects of our ultimate triumph in winning the chance to do something about a better world.

The answer to why we must now determine to stand tall in Vietnam is most clearly seen in the perspective of the cold war itself. In the wake of World War II, indeed, as following all of the great wars of history, the delicate political balances of the world were in a desperate state of discombobulation. Usually it falls to the victor, or victors, to reconstitute a new balance as a substitute for a continuation of both the chaos and anarchy of open warfare.

History thrust upon the people of America the frightening, but nonetheless indispensable, task of redrawing the lines of stability about the power spheres of the globe. The job ahead was not only more desperate, but more complicated than any of the preceding intervals in human history. For not only were three of the great powers left prostrate in the debacle of defeat; namely, Germany, Italy, and Japan; but even two of the victorious giants were compelled by the ravages of war to abandon their traditional power political positions around the world; namely, Great Britain and France. Only the Soviet Union at that time was in a position to challange and/or frustrate the reestablishment of a workable balance. The sequence of crises between the Soviets and the Americans for the next several years spells out the history of that struggle. The successive challenges from the Kremlin were issued in Greece, in Western Europe, in Berlin. In each instance, our country made the determination that to yield at any one of those points would be to forfeit the chance to achieve a more stable world balance. American policy committed itself even to the point of war if necessary in order to prevail. As it turned out, this was the one language the Soviets seemed best to understand.

More than a century ago Lord Palmerston in Britain aptly described the policy of the Russian bear in a meaningful analogy which applies even now. He is supposed to have said that the Russians follow a policy in diplomacy of constant probing and pressing outward along their own periphery, seeking soft spots. Where there was no resistance, the Russians broke through and extended their holdings. But where resisted, they pulled back and went elsewhere, perhaps to return to the same spot later when the resistor might relax his vigilance. This parallel drawn by the distinguished British Minister a hundred years ago should not be lost upon us today. For our long and tortous years of cold war have served to underscore the validity of Palmerston's analysis. It is well to note, incidentally, that all of this preceded Lenin, and Stalin, and the Soviet Marxists and that perhaps we would do well to characterize what is taking place today less in terms of world communism and more in terms of world imperialism if we are to be accurate in our assessment of the policies of either Moscow or Peiping.

To resume the course of cold war policy, once the Soviets were stopped in Europe, they turned to a new tactical maneuver as they probed for new weakness along the frontlines of power politics; namely, in Korea. There the issue was limited war, and there the answer arrived at by the Americans was the same—the drawing of a firm line along the 38th parallel across which neither side dared to venture with impunity.

The next stage of tactical coldwarsmanship centered in the nuclear rivalry between the two surviving giants of the last war. And for a long time the complete policy projection focused on what was commonly referred to as the big war or a nuclear holocaust. Once this newest thrust was blunted by the establishment of substantial superiority in the free world, the focus shifted to a development that had been underway for several years—transferring the battle-

ground to the economic and psychological realm sometimes characterized for the stomachs of man and the minds of men. Here again the Communists failed miserably. They failed to gratify or to hold out measurable hope to the dreams of the literally billions of people whose expectations of a better life had been triggered by the collapse of the old colonial empires and by a resurgent nationalism everywhere around the globe.

And so now we find the tactic shifting again, along with the center of command. It is moving from the focus in the Western World, always excepting Korea, to the mysterious lands of the East, with the initiative coming less from Moscow and more from Peiping. The device was to be guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla combat is the ugliest, dirtiest, least decisive kind of war of all. In it, the initial advantage always lies with the guerrillas. Our own observers remind us that for every one guerrilla, the defending forces require 10 to 20 combat troops.

This disproportion in manpower alone underscores the extreme difficulty of winning this kind of conflict. It means that whenever the Vietcong smuggle a thousand men over the line into the south, they have, in effect, achieved the impact of an entire division. To compound the hazards, guerrilla tactics do not permit an open confrontation or even the successful seizure of an objective. Success to them is measured only in terms of hit and run. Their supply lines, moreover, are virtually indiscernible as they pitterpat down an obscure jungle path, generally under cover of darkness. Their terror tactics, in addition, provoke panic and wreak havoc in any community which they preselect as the target for tonight. However vicious, and unsavory, and costly, and maddening these tactics may seem to us, it is important that we put them in their proper perspective. They constitute simply another face of Communist tactical probing actions, searching out weakness along the thin line of separating them from their ambitions—a line drawn and manned largely by the United States and its allies. It is in this context that the importance of drawing a firm line and holding it in east Asia should become more obvious. We should not forget that the world is still round, and the balance of power is as much at stake in Indochina as it was in Greece or in Berlin. While it is currently popular to ridicule the domino theory in southeast Asia, its validity cannot be wished away by a torrent of words. For if China indeed prevails in Vietnam, who can persuade the Thais, or the Malaysians, or the Filipinos, or even the Cambodians or Indonesians that they still have a chance to stand independently of the colossus of the north—Peiping?

Already the Communists have made it clear that Bangkok is the next target. Demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur, Jakharta, and Manila serve as sobering reminders that there are plenty of voices and bosses waiting for the signals from the mainland. The combined natural resources of southeast Asia have been attractive to most of the great imperial powers of all time and have invited seizure from the days of the colonial capitals of Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries down through the Japanese in 1941. There is no reason to think that the assessment of the importance of these resources has changed in Peiping Rubber, tin, oil, and rice together represent significant additions to the mainland of China. All of these added to the human resources involved and the psychological gains to be realized, has whetted both the appetite and the superconfidence of the Chinese Communists that theirs indeed is the wave of the future. It would only be a matter of timing when they would then prepare to break through Burma into the great underbelly of Asia, the vast Indian subcontinent. What then will have happened to our noble intentions of redressing the power balances of the world to the advantage of freedom and independent nationalities?

PLAN OF ACTION

When the American position in Vietnam is viewed within the context of the perspective of 20 years of cold war it becomes more clear what our course of action must be. This should include the following steps:

First. Announce the drawing of a firm line along the 17th parallel and projected westward along a route to conform with the independent status of the other countries bordering on China, making it clear that we intend to tolerate no breaches of that line and that, starting along the 17th parallel, the Vietcong infiltrations from the north must cease at once.

Second. If within a specified number of days the Vietnamese do not cut off their probing activities across the line, we should announce our intentions to bomb all military bases, airfields, marshaling areas, and encampments in North Vietnam.

Third. If this still does not persuade them of our intention to stand in southeast Asia, then we should announce that we will proceed to the bombing of logistic targets—bridges and transportation lines.

Fourth. Should the above measures still not persuade the Vietcong of our full intentions, we should also announce that we shall next proceed to the bombing of industrial centers and other obvious supply targets in support of their military effort.

Fifth. Simultaneously, we should make clear that we are ready to talk, that we are prepared to negotiate a reasonable settlement in Indochina. We should make it clear, however, that the 17th parallel and the land below it are not negotiable. In the words of the late President Kennedy:

> We are willing to negotiate freely, but never willing to negotiate freedom.

Sixth. We should make it crystal clear to both Hanoi and to Peiping, and incidentally to the world at large, that we have no territorial ambitions anywhere in Asia—or around the globe, for that matter—that we have no designs on their government or their internal politics. They must wrestle with their own internal futures as far as we are concerned.

None of us can know for sure how this proposal may be received. Obviously, we have to plan for the worst and hope for the best. However, a projection of military action alone might only escalate into war through accident or misunderstanding. On the other hand, a negotiation drive by itself could leave something neither satisfying or definitive in the power status in the east. But combined, they would seem to offer the best chance to bring a sense of relative stability in southeast Asia. And it has the great advantage of clearing up the many uncertainties surrounding the American position in Asia. There would be ample reason to hope that this kind of language would get through to Hanoi. Very probably Ho Chi Minh no more relishes the prospect of domination by Peiping than do the other governments in his part of the world. The net effect of the plan would be to force the Vietcong to examine their cards once again and to reassess their judgment on the price they are willing to pay for their gamble to the south.

Obviously, lurking in the background of such a proposal is the far more sinister prospect of the response in Peiping. While we would hope it would serve as a deterrent to them in their calculations for the future, we would not dare rule out the possibility that they might declare war. This is the question that the Chinese alone must determine. Are they ready or willing to commit their 2 to 3 million trained men to a venture in southeast Asia at this time? Most observers think not; but if they should make that decision, it means that this is the price they are willing to pay at any time for the region, and better we know it sooner rather than later. If in the lexicon of Communist Chinese tactics and strategy it is already written that they are willing to pay the supreme price for Indochina, it is better than we know it now than to discover it piecemeal after it is too late.

Like the fateful days of Munich in 1938, the unknown qualities of the answer to the central question of Chinese intentions haunt us even more so today. Arnold Toynbee once reminded us that history repeats itself only when man makes the same mistakes over again. This is no time for another Munich.

Remembering, as we do, the several instances in which we as a Nation have been willing to risk all-out war during the last 20 years, it is important that we not forfeit what we have gained to date by a momentary lapse in our determination to seal off the forces of world imperialism. Indeed, there are substantive reasons to believe that the Chinese are only probing and are in no position to pay such a price. In any event, such a strong affirmation from the United States would almost certainly do wonders for the morale of the nations now living on the brink of such vast uncertainties in southeast Asia. The climax to such an American projection might then well be a nationwide—indeed, a worldwide—television and radio appearance by the President of the United States in which he would spell out in precise terms these objections very much in the manner in which the late President Kennedy spelled them out on Cuba in that fateful

October of 1962. This would have the advantage of galvanizing world attention and opinion and at the same time of reaffirming America's desire to take nothing away from anybody, nor to invade, as an aggressor, the real estate of any power in Asia. At the same time, it would serve notice on the Peiping crowd that we do indeed intend to stay and to fight if that is their choice.

The 1930's taught us that we cannot appease the mighty or the ambitious, but the 1950's and the 1960's have taught us that they can be contained and even stopped short of a big war. It is the calculated risk we have to take now. And from such a stance the United States would then be in a position to lead from strength in any proposal for discussions or negotiations on drawing a firm line across the south of Asia and across which neither side would dare to venture recklessly or irresponsibly in the future. Such, it seems to me, is the best hope for a constructive policy of American leadership in the present crisis in south Asia.

The acceptance of these terms and an observance of the 17th parallel as the dividing line would mean the prospect of living with two Vietnams.

While the concept of two Vietnams might not be the most desirable, we now live with two Koreas, two Chinas, two Berlins, and two Germanys; and this has become a way of life that has at least provided some degree of stability around the world. The line drawn and maintained across Vietnam would be a vital last link in the chain against the spread of communism all over the world—a line protected mainly by the United States—and we dare not forfeit this link to impatience.

While this is not peace, it can be a step toward it. When the shooting stopped at the end of World War II, there was no peace, simply because wars are not waged for peace. Rather, they are fought in order to win the chance to make a lasting peace. And in these 20 years of so-called cold war, the battle has continued. We are fighting for the chance. Winning that chance must preceede winning the peace. The price we have already paid for that chance ought to haunt us every night. What we do with that chance may even now hang in the balance in Vietnam. How we marshal our determination to continue our efforts unabated by the tendency of digression or withdrawal is likely to determine the course of this history of our time and, in so doing, the dimensions of the peace for which we all strive.

RECESS UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, in accordance with the previous order I move that the Senate stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, in accordance with the previous order, until tomorrow, Thursday, February 18, 1965, at 10 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate February 17, 1965:

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT

John A. Gronouski, of Wisconsin, to be Postmaster General.

U.S. ATTORNEY

William P. Copple, of Arizona, to be U.S. attorney for the district of Arizona for the term of 4 years, vice Charles A. Muecke, resigned.

U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Arnold M. Picker, of New York, to be a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs for the remainder of the term expiring May 11, 1965, and until his successor is appointed and has qualified.

The following-named persons to be members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs for terms of 3 years expiring May 11, 1967, and until their successors are appointed and have qualified:

Dr. Homer Daniels Babbidge, Jr., of Connecticut.

Dr. Walter Johnson, of Illinois.

Dr. Roy E. Larsen, of Connecticut.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

Maj. Gen. Ralph Edward Haines, Jr., O19849, U.S. Army, in the grade of lieutenant general.

IN THE NAVY

Having designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, Vice Adm. Roy L. Johnson, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, I nominate him for appointment to the grade of admiral while so serving.

Having designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, Rear Adm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, I nominate him for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving.

IN THE ARMY

The following-named officers for appointment in the Regular Army of the United States to the grade indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, sections 3284, 3306, and 3307:

To be major generals

Maj. Gen. Charles Salvatore D'Orsa, O18866, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Herbert George Sparrow, O19003, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Oren Eugene Hurlbut, O19077, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. David Parker Gibbs, O19189, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Thomas Heber Lipscomb, O19371, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Jonathan Owen Seaman, O19385, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. John Francis Franklin, Jr., O19476, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson Boyle, O19924, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Robert Carson Kyser, O19535, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Harry Jacob Lemley, Jr., O19756, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Hugh McClellan Exton, O19780, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Harry Herndon Critz, O19786, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Eugene Albert Salet, O30790, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., O20117, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. William Reeves Shuler, O20118, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. James Benjamin Lampert, O20147, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. John Edward Kelly, O20156, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Selwyn Dyson Smith, Jr., O20194, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Gen. William Childs Westmoreland, O20223, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Beverley Evans Powell, O20237, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. John Arnold Heintges, O20281, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Gen. Creighton Williams Abrams, Jr., O20296, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Lt. Gen. John Hersey Michaelis, O20328, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. Edwin Hess Burba, O31518, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

Maj. Gen. John Graham Zierdt, O20632, Army of the United States (brigadier general, U.S. Army).

To be brigadier generals

Brig. Gen. Joseph Wilson Johnston, O30462, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Cornelis De Witt Willcox Lang, O19734, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Clarence Carl Haug, O19736, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Frank Alexander Osmanski, O19745, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Charles Albert Symroski, O19753, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Robert Rigby Glass, O19765, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army.)

Brig. Gen. Francis Johnstone Murdoch, Jr., O19853, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Lawrence Edward Schlanser, O19886, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. John Allen Beall, Jr., O19907, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. George Madison Jones, O19965, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Melville Brown Coburn, O19973, Army of the United States (colonel, U.S. Army).

kind will have no more war, but submits to the merciful arbitration of God instead.

Who are we to say that for our ease we ought at once to break off resistance and negotiate a settlement that can only prove to be a moratorium until a bitterer day? That counsel of weakness, all too common in church circles these days, fails to embrace the deeper paradox expressed by Lincoln: that even though the foreground may be filled with bombs bursting in air and all the moral stench of war, yet this is only to be seen against the broad background of God's wider purpose, by which suffering becomes the womb of salvation, an instrument of cleansing and redeeming, even as Christ upon His cross set new meaning to life and gave us the power to be sons of God.

What can we do, we ordinary citizens, about the war in Vietnam? Well, first we can have the courage to suffer, and the patient faith to long endure, knowing as did Abraham Lincoln that the right, which only God can let us glimpse, is in His hands and not our own. "God is not bound," cried the saint, "and therefore I suffer all things." It is high time, I would think, that we understand how those two things go together. He who waits upon the Lord must often bear outrage at the hands of them that will not wait, but would take fate violently into their own hands. Let us not be so nearsighted as to think that we can extricate ourselves from the evil, if God's judgment has yet to be fulfilled in the world. Until then we must not, we cannot, shrink from the battle, if perchance we might be chosen as the instruments of His will.

Now this last is a mighty big "if." But it was a proposition in which Lincoln deeply believed. It was the other profound meaning that he discerned in the holocaust around him. The first was God's judgment upon all, both North and South. The second was God's promise that if the compact of liberty embedded in the American Constitution might survive, it could become the holy grail of all mankind, the sacred offering, bought with blood, of one people to all. It was this that made the suffering endurable. "In giving freedom to the slave," he wrote, "we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth."

What Lincoln saw was the corporateness of life, and that God fashions a destiny not just for your life or mine as individuals but for the whole tissue of society together. "We fight," said St. Paul, "against principalities and powers," which is to say against evil on a cosmic scale. And on that same scale God ordains for all mankind a majestic prize, which is the brotherhood of freedom and the generosity of peace universal. The meaning of each man's life and the moral glory of a chosen race is rooted in God's commission to fight in such a cause, on such a scale. Therefore freedom, as Lincoln said, is indivisible; it cannot be divided. It has no reality if all do not enjoy its blessing. The horizon of southerners and northern abolitionists alike was too circumscribed to descry the necessity of that ultimate unity. Each in his way proposed to bind the word of God, and thus they move the crown of thorns upon the embattled head of the President.

But now, as history has marched across another century, we are given to see an even broader horizon than Lincoln saw. If he understood that liberty could be based on nothing less than a continent, we must perceive its worldwide dimension. The present conflict in Vietnam is not just an incidental entanglement in which somehow we have been unfortunately involved. It is rather the momentary focal point of a titanic struggle to determine in every valley of earth whether man can fulfill the image that God has imprinted on his brow or whether he must ever remain under the bondage of blindness and human chicanery.

There are, of course, as there have always been, narrow men who cannot read that broad canvas now spread before us. Preoccupied with the immediate locale of conflict, they would end the evil as if the freedom of the human race was not interconnected; as if we could give up all of Asia to the serfdom of darkness and still rejoice in the light of freedom on this side of the world.

It is, I think, too bad that our present leaders have chosen the word "retaliation" to explain our recent actions; for, despite the use of this childish word, retaliation is certainly not our policy. Tit for tat is not a policy at all, but only the petulant response of an angry adolescent.

Rather should it be plainly declared that we have accepted the dire risk of wider combat because we must make it unmistakably evident that we will not abandon the moral calling which God has laid upon us. We will not give up; we will use every means to persuade others that attack is futile; we believe in this thing that is called freedom, even though it requires the sacifice of our very lives in the distant skies of an alien land.

We believe in this, let us acknowledge it, not because we find the free way of life congenial and, in fact, prosperous to boot, but because on the mileposts of history we have seen the signs of Providence: God will have it no other way than that all men one day shall walk upright in His kingdom, fair and free. It may indeed appear presumptuous to suppose that for so great a destiny, God has chosen us as His instruments. Yet if at the beginning we recognize His judgment first, his abhorrence of our abysmal unworthiness, the hollowness of all our perverted pretension—if, like Lincoln, we humbly lay our sin before Him at the very beginning, then may we not look to the promise, the scared calling of a people made worthy by grace to give its life on a cross, if it must be, for the sake of a happier resurrection which God has in store for us and for all men. "Take up thy cross," said Christ, "and follow me."

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF GEORGE WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, next Monday, this great Republic of 190 million people will commemorate the 233d anniversary of the birthday of the father of our country, our first Commander in Chief, our first President—George Washington.

Any schoolboy knows that much about February 22 and American history. Any schoolboy believes that date is important, even though he may not swallow the cherry tree legend anymore.

The average school child, like the average American, does not yet know that we in this great Nation's Capital do know about February 22: That this date has been taken over by the supermerchandisers, that the Federal District of this great commercially oriented commonwealth, which General and President Washington had such a great part in founding and establishing under just law, the hallowed line may be replaced by this new pitch:

First in price, first in sales, and first in merchandising for its countrymen.

The massive buildup has been underway for days in the Nation's Capital. By radio, TV, newspapers, handbills, billboards, and even sandwich signs, day and night at full blast, the citizens of the Nation's Capital are having dinned into their ears the new price-tag meaning that has been unfortunately attached to the birthday of George Washington.

In every retail establishment in the metropolitan area, the forces are being mobilized, a travail of preparation for a so-called birthday celebration is underway. This furious activity occupies Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday of this week—and, yes, even Sunday of the next.

Then on Mondays—bang, bang, bang—comes the great climax as the cash registers toll the day in beautiful but raucous cacophony.

Who knows, perhaps it will be the first $10 million sales day in the city that bears his name. Ah, the thrill of celebration that is ahead.

Each year, in recent years, while this birthday carnival of sales, sales, sales, occupies thousands on the nearby streets, I have come to this Chamber to listen intently to our annual reading of President Washington's Farewell Address. This is a delightful custom. Each year, he seems to be speaking directly to us on some issue pending for that day. His fatherly advice always seems to be in point and to the point directly.

I have yet to catch even a hint from his farewell message about the merchandising spree that rules the city beyond Capitol Hill.

The bargain boosters and the merchandising geniuses may have gone too far. Had they stopped with a dignified sales festival in memory of a frugal President—our first President—then, perhaps, it might have been taken as a tribute to him as the godfather of all U.S. entrepreneurs. This might not have been such a bad idea in this loyal and dedicated constituency—commemorating the birth of its namesake.

But, as February 22 has been given a fancy and profitable veneer in the marketplace of Washington, D.C., other dates throughout the year have undergone more blatant commercialization. Thus, Labor Day becomes a back-to-school extravaganza, Thanksgiving a preholiday shopping spree for the winter stockpile of strong spirits, Valentine's Day a frolic for the lingerie buyers, and——

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Oklahoma has expired.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONRONEY. On Mother's Day, an excuse is made for spending in honor of that greatest of institutions—motherhood; Easter, of course, for bonnets, bangles, and bunnies.

Let us not even mention Christmas. The exploitation that has occurred throughout Christendom, often in denigration of the birth of our Saviour, is a subject too well understood to be dwelt upon.

In view of the cynicism now rampant in the name of commerce between the several States and the spread of the promotional gimmick based on his birthday, I wonder whether the Founding Fathers

should not have gone a little further and agreed to tighter language in the clause that limits the power of Congress to regulate commerce only between the several States.

Maybe our forefathers should have permitted regulation of intrastate commerce by Congress on matters other than minimum wages and civil rights. Perhaps they should have foreseen the frenzied efforts of local merchants to clear the shelves of the "cats and dogs" that remain unsold even after the Christmas shopping and even after the January white sales.

Perhaps we can now find a solution. Perhaps our young people can be recrited for an antipoverty program to relieve the eager beaver advertising men who now seek to stave off hunger with their annual Washington's birthday sales buildup.

Perhaps we can go a step beyond the Peace Corps—to a Sales Corps, or maybe send this long-neglected merchandise with the Peace Corps men into the "have-not" areas in the world. The beads and trinkets that helped win the West might even now have modern substitiutes. Could not this slow-moving merchandise still be distributed somewhere on the frontier? Or, perhaps, on the new frontier? What better succor for the depressed areas of Appalachia or, for that matter, the deprived Paradise Valley of Arizona?

No, we have not heard anything in the annual February 22 birthday recital in the Senate about the merchandising spectacular.

Maybe George Washington was speaking to us, as ever, in a subtle way, or even in a subtle voice. He would talk about frugality and paying as you go. He would, at the same time, hold out the need for fiscal responsibility for his government of the District of Columbia. But, he did not say anything about personal frugality.

Because the District of Columbia government is dependent upon a high volume income from a sales tax, perhaps he brought up fiscal stability to government while playing "heck" with personal fiscal stability. But, like the old barroom song:

"My father's a typewriter vendor,
My mother will merchandise gin,
My uncle he takes in the laundry,
My gosh how the money rolls in."

The fiscal affairs of the District will be preserved, provided—and this is a big provided—of course, that the merchants do not cut the price quite so close as they claim to be doing on most of their stock. Volume is important, but too deep cuts would cut down on the District sales tax final take.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I heard the acting majority leader make a statement that the leaders of the minority in the House and Senate have expressed approval of the President's course in South Vietnam.

I am glad to hear that statement made. It appears to me that this item is of such importance that voices from the Congress should be heard throughout the country so that uniformed citizens may obtain knowledge of the facts and better be able to guide themselves on the course that we should follow.

I have been a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations for 7 years. The subject of southeast Asia and Vietnam has been one of importance. It has been especially significant to me because I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee.

In the hearings held on former Indochina, the witnesses who appeared representing the respective Presidents since 1956—the Secretaries of State, the Secretaries of Defense, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—without exception declared that our presence in Asia was primarily to protect the security and life of the United States.

While the Presidents did not appear before the committee, their representatives did. Everyone, without exception, stated that for the protection of our shores and our lives and the security of our Nation, we could not afford to pull out of South Vietnam.

Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, recognizing their grave responsibility to the Nation, and the grave consequences that might result from involvement, nevertheless stated flatly that we could not pull out without endangering the security of our land, which has given so much to all of us.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I ask that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Testimony has been given to the effect that if we pull out, the first line of defense, instead of being 5,000 miles away, will be brought to Hawaii and to the continental shores of the United States.

The words of these leaders in describing the need for staying in southeast Asia cannot be disregarded.

Let us consider the problem which is immediately facing us. The problem is not the product of our acts. We committed no overt acts of aggression. Our men were killed and our property was destroyed and our flag was pulled down.

My question is: Were we to stand idly by? Were we to do nothing? Was it not the duty and responsibility of a nation which believes in integrity and in performance of obligations, not only to its own citizens but also to those with whom it has treaties, to assert itself?

If we had done nothing, would that have been the end of it? It certainly would not.

Arguments will be made on the floor today to the effect that we should create a neutral government in Vietnam. The argument will be made that we should create a neutralized coalition government. To Senators who make that argument I say, Let us look back to developments since World War II. Can they point to a single instance when a coalition government or a neutral government worked out in accordance with the anticipation when the agreement was made?

What happened to Poland, to Hungary, to Rumania, to Yugoslavia, and to Czechoslovakia? What is happening to Laos since a neutral, coalition agreement went into effect in 1962?

Finally, what has happened in China, the source of all our troubles? A coalition government was forced upon Chiang Kai-shek. He worked diligently to make a coalition government live. The Communists broke their word. They have broken their word every time a neutral government has been set up.

Now we are told that we should pull out. Pull out to where? Will that be the end of our troubles? Would we not immediately have trouble in Thailand, in the Philippines, and probably in Australia? When people say we should pull out, I ask the question: Where to? We cannot pull out far enough to satisfy the maw of the Communists.

STATE AND LOCAL ARTS COUNCILS IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the New York Times of Monday, February 15, reports that a central office will be established by arts councils in the United States and Canada.

Since New York pioneered in the establishment of a State arts council 5 years ago, 25 States have followed suit. There are another 125 private councils throughout the Nation and, of course, the National Council, established last year by legislation which a number of my colleagues and I had offered.

As the number of these organizations increases, so do requests for advice and assistance directed to the Arts Councils of America, Inc. This nonprofit group will establish the central office to keep up with the needs of the expanding arts council movement.

The New York Times article describes the growth of councils and the achievements of several individual groups—including the Oswego Arts Guild in Oswego, N.Y. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ARTS GROUPS PLAN A CENTRAL OFFICE: RESEARCH SERVICES WILL BE PROVIDED FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MOVEMENTS—UNIT'S EXPANSION CITED: COUNCILS IN UNITED STATES AND CANADA TO STAFF HEADQUARTERS WITH PAID EMPLOYEES

(By Theodore Strongin)

Arts councils in the United States and Canada plan to establish a central headquarters staffed with paid employees before the summer. The office will provide research services for the growing arts council movement, private and public. Its location is still uncertain.

It will be set up by Arts Councils of America, Inc., a nonprofit organization that has been trying to keep up with the needs of the expanding movement with volunteers.

The New York State Council of the Arts starts its fifth year on March 29. It was the first State council in this country. Since it began, 25 States have established arts councils.

"(4) the term 'person' includes any firm, corporation, or association."

(b) The amendment made by this section shall take effect on the first day of the sixth month beginning after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 2. No amendment made by this Act shall be construed to repeal, invalidate, supersede, or otherwise adversely affect—

(a) the Federal Trade Commission Act or any statute defined therein as an Antitrust Act;

(b) the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act;

(c) the Hazardous Substance Act; or

(d) any provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendment unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendment *in its application to interstate or foreign commerce* and such provision of State law.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The reason for the request is that tomorrow we shall discuss the question of the reference of the so-called labeling and packaging bill. Because it has been modified slightly, the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee is asking that the bill be referred to the Committee on Commerce instead of the Committee on the Judiciary. The bill has been in the Judiciary Committee for at least 2 years—perhaps a little longer. The committee has taken at least 2,000 pages of testimony. Notwithstanding the technical change in the text of the bill, I believe that jurisdiction ought to remain in the Judiciary Committee. But if not, the bill ought to go back to the Committee on the Judiciary when it has completed its course in the Committee on Commerce.

LET US SEARCH FOR PEACE

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to speak for an additional 3 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, it was truly said by a very great American in the search for peace, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

Since 1954, we have been involved against our will in South Vietnam. Three Presidents—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—have properly determined that were the Communists to take over southeast Asia and drive us out of South Vietnam, they would then be in a position to take over the Philippines, South Korea, and in time the outer western defense of the free world might well be Australia and Hawaii.

Mr. President, we sorrow over the death of American soldiers on this frontier of freedom in South Vietnam. We should and do take pride in the great retaliatory blows which have made it perfectly clear to the Communist dictators of Red China and the Soviet Union that Americans will never quit under fire, retreat from southeast Asia, or submit to Communist aggression.

We will continue to use our tremendous power to aid in repelling Communist aggressors in South Vietnam. Of course, we must not and we shall not be bogged down in a land war on the Asiatic mainland. We know that our planes can strike by air from our carriers and floating bases which are invulnerable to Communist retaliation. We know we are superior in power on land and sea and in the air to all nations in the world combined.

However, history over 2,000 years teaches that we must not and we need not send in land forces—it would seem unthinkable to do so—against the huge masses of the Soviet Union and Red China, where life is valued so cheaply, for they could overwhelm us on land as over the centuries they have swallowed up and overwhelmed other opponents.

Ours is, we are proud to say, and must continue to be in this grim period of international anarchy, a nation vastly superior in missile power in the air, on the sea, and under the sea. Even though the Communist aggression of Red China and the Soviet Union were to be combined, they could not successfully contend against us in the air, on the sea, or under the sea.

The Communist dictators are now fully aware of our determination to fulfill our commitments to South Vietnam. It would be no sign of weakness to negotiate toward a peaceful solution of that conflict.

It seems to me that now is the time to proclaim to the world that the United States is ready to meet at Geneva over the conference table with representatives of China and North Vietnam and our allies of the free world to see if we cannot negotiate a settlement which would leave South Vietnam a free nation clear of aggressors from the north.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Let us remember that Austria was neutralized by agreement of the heads of state of the free world and the Soviet Union, and Austria has remained absolutely neutral.

Laos was neutralized by agreement of the Soviet Union and of the free world, and open warfare has been avoided in that area.

The limited nuclear test ban treaty, which was ratified by the Senate by an overwhelming vote, has not been violated by the Communists.

I point to these things because we know that many agreements the Communists have made have been violated by them, but those which I have mentioned have not. Therefore, let us try to secure commitments from the Communists of North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Red China to leave their neighbors in South Vietnam alone. Then we would agree to withdraw our forces, and to the United Nations could be reposed the task of maintaining the peace in southeast Asia.

However, if such an agreement cannot be arrived at, all Americans are united behind the policy of the administration to give a mighty blow to the Communist aggressors from the north for every blow suffered from them in South Vietnam. We shall continue that policy until we destroy their installations and drive back the Communist infiltrators and their armies, unless they agree to sit down at the conference table and try to work out the problems involved as civilized nations should work out such problems.

THE PRESIDENT'S SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM FOR THE WAR ON POVERTY

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, if this Nation is to fulfill its destiny, it must not only be strong and free, but all of its people must be in a position to participate in that freedom. A man without a job, a child without an opportunity, a woman shackled to poverty—these are people who cannot fully participate in this Nation's freedom.

The President's program is clearly designed to eliminate these pockets of want from our national affluence.

It is not an easy job. But it is a start. It took courage and determination to take the first step. Now we have taken that step. This Nation is engaged in a war on poverty.

The first signs are encouraging, but we must be prepared for frustrations and failures, for disappointments and doubts. The program the President outlines is realistic. It appreciates the problems, but does not duck from the responsibilities.

If we do no more in our generation than break the cycle of poverty—insuring that the children of poverty do not become the fathers of poverty—our grandchildren will know that we have lived in historic times.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, the country has already shown that it approves of our action of last year in passing the Economic Opportunity Act. Enthusiastic as I was about the act, I never thought the response would be so overwhelming. Hundreds of communities have already started organizing themselves for their participation in the war on poverty. More than 80 percent of all cities with a population of over 50,000 have taken the necessary steps for their participation.

There are other ways, too, for measuring the great response to the Economic Opportunity Act; but I am particularly pleased that we have obtained this degree of local community participation. It demonstrates that there can, in fact, be a great partnership between the Federal Government and the local governments of America in furthering a great national objective. We must not let these communities down. This Congress must extend and expand the program in order to meet the needs of all of our communities.

While the economic opportunity program has barely begun, it is already bringing the poor into the planning and operation of local programs in a way that is unknown in any other government programs. Under programs approved to date, thousands of poor people will be working in nonprofessional jobs, on projects in their own communities and neighborhoods. Representatives of the poor and of minority groups are active participants on the community-wide boards and committees directing

the program. Neighborhood organizations are being extensively used. This, in my opinion, is probably the single most important aspect of the brave beginning made thus far in the war on poverty.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish to read to my distinguished colleagues an excerpt from a letter:

For many years my country, the United States of America, has been doing things for me. I now want to do something for my country.

This letter was written by a 66-year-old retired woodworker who wants to enlist in the war on poverty. He wrote it to VISTA, our new domestic version of the Peace Corps.

Volunteers in Service to America has received more than 8,000 applications from young and older Americans who want to contribute their talents and energy to this noble domestic effort. More than 300 communities have asked for volunteers. The requests for individual volunteers total 2,500.

The first men and women are already serving on the front lines of the war on poverty. They graduated last week from the training course at Camp New Hope, N.C. Others will graduate next week; and in the months ahead still others, in ever larger numbers will begin training.

VISTA—the place where any American 18 years of age or older can make a personal contribution—is showing that our citizens are as committed to the war on poverty as is their Government.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the poverty program is now only 4 months old—and over 500 projects totaling $300 million have been approved. The President's war on poverty is already becoming every American's war on poverty. Community programs have been initiated through untold hours of uncompensated work by community leaders and by thousands of ordinary Americans. The advertising industry alone has contributed over $6 million in time to carry the story to the country. Young people are volunteering for VISTA assignments for local program work. College students are tutoring youngsters in deprived areas. The war on poverty has tapped the wide vein of idealism in America—and Americans are responding in tens of thousands.

Nearly every major business corporation in America is involved in fighting the war on poverty. Over 50 have submitted plans to operate Job Corps camps. The executives of hundreds of businesses are already serving on local community action committees, with many of them serving as chairmen. Many businesses have lent the services of their top executives to special or long-range assignments in the program. Several retired business executives have been accepted by the VISTA volunteers and a number are working with the Small Business Administration by helping the poor start and operate businesses which increase employment. All major networks, billboard companies, newspaper and magazine publishers have donated time and space totaling $6 million for promotion programs on the war on poverty.

The beginning of the war on poverty has ended. There is so much work to be done.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, last week the American Bar Association, in its annual convention in New Orleans, took cognizance of the groundbreaking efforts of the war on poverty in providing legal services to the poor. The legal profession and the public are rapidly coming to the awareness that the protection of the law has often been effectively denied the poor. In many communities the provision of legal services to the poor are in being or are planned as part of community antipoverty campaigns. Through these services the poor can learn of their rights and of ways the law can protect them from the exploration which contributes to the cycle of poverty. These services, run in cooperation with local bar groups, promise to bring justice to people who have never known the law except as an oppressor. This cooperation between the bar and other elements in the community working to eradicate poverty is another example of the interest and concern which the war on poverty has generated in all sectors of American society.

THE CITIZENS CRUSADE AGAINST POVERTY—ADDRESS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964 signaled a new attitude toward poverty; the recognition that it is often self-perpetuating, and the determination to break the cycle by an all-out attack on its root causes.

But law is futile unless it wins the acceptance, the respect, and the support of the people. We have encouraging evidence that the Economic Opportunity Act is enlisting the most positive and affirmative response from persons eager to transform its directives into action and its ideals into reality.

On Wednesday, February 10, Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY addressed such a gathering, the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty. This group is composed of leaders of many different types of national organizations, including civic, business, women's and labor groups. It testifies to the heartening support of the program by all segments of our communities.

Charged with coordinating Federal programs in this area, the Vice President not only brings to this task an intimate acquaintance with the legislation and with the problems of poverty, but he also sets an example by his spirited commitment. I ask unanimous consent that the Vice President's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY TO THE CITIZENS CRUSADE AGAINST POVERTY, FEBRUARY 10, 1965

In the year 1620, John Winthrop, later to be the first Governor of Massachusetts, assembled the Pilgrims on the deck of the *Mayflower* and told them: "We must consider that we shall be as a city set upon a hill and the eyes of all people will be upon us."

The Pilgrims were in the middle of the Atlantic when John Winthrop told them of their special place in history. Today, the eyes of all people are still upon us—but our city is not yet complete.

Like the Pilgrims, we are still in midpassage. We cannot continue our journey—we cannot complete our city—until we achieve the proudest goal to which any nation has yet aspired: the goal of equal opportunity for all Americans. The passage of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was a firm and determined step toward that goal—toward the creation of that city on the hill.

I welcome you today as you come together to offer the Nation your time, your talents, and your matchless experience. We shall surely need them as—together—we take the next step in our journey: the eradication of poverty in all its forms.

The annals of the poor are neither short nor simple in midcentury America—if, indeed, they ever were. An understanding of the dimensions of the problem we face requires not merely compassion but comprehension—comprehension of the incomprehensible.

To those persons grown accustomed to the face of a smiling America, the facts of poverty are baffling. To understand them requires a realization that:

In the midst of the richest nation in all of history, 35 million Americans, almost one-fifth of the Nation, are poor by generally accepted standards;

The average income of the almost 10 million American families in poverty is less than $1,800 a year.

This, then, is the far side of our paradise.

Until recently, the cruelest aspect of poverty in America seemed to be its sheer hopelessness. For many persons, the future appeared no brighter than the past—in this land of milk and honey, some people appeared destined to taste only bitter dregs.

It has been demonstrated, for example, that a child born in poverty in an American city is likely to become a slow learner, an illiterate, a reject, a delinquent, and a criminal—he is likely to live miserably, die young, and leave no legacy but offspring fated to meet the same ignominious destiny.

It is both incredible and intolerable that in 40 percent of the families receiving aid for families with dependent children either the father or the mother were themselves raised in families which had also received public assistance.

We must break the cycle of poverty. We must free millions of Americans from the bondage of that tragic equation which often decrees that poor shall beget poor and ignorance shall beget misery. And this is the goal of the war on poverty.

This is a war to which we are unconditionally committed. But we have not finally, irrevocably selected our strategy and tactics. The battles are to be fought on largely uncharted terrain—where armies have never clashed.

You know, of course, some of the weapons we have already chosen. You know some of the battles we are now beginning to wage. You know, for example, that the President has called for a doubling of the present program levels for the Office of Economic Opportunity.

You know of the community action programs—by July 1965 we will have funded about 400 local antipoverty plans and programs, and the 1966 budget will support 600 such programs.

You know of the Job Corps—by July we will be well along toward training more than 25,000 youths, and by 1966 the Corps will have established more than 100 urban and rural residential centers for young men and women, to give them basic education, skilled training, and sound working experience.

ket for the next 3 years while the United States works to correct its balance-of-payments problem. In 1964 the IDB floated $150 million in bonds in the U.S. capital market in two separate flotations. Could we not persuade the Western European countries with large dollar holdings to purchase IDB dollar denominated 20-year bonds which pay 4½ percent—more than they presently receive in short-term U.S. securities? This committee may further deem it appropriate to limit its authorization to 1 or 2 years in order to have the opportunity to review in less than the requested 3-year period our financial ability to make commitments which have an adverse impact on our balance of payments.

PROTECTION AGAINST EXPROPRIATION

The policy of the U.S. Government as embodied in the existing foreign assistance legislation is to discourage expropriation. Specifically, section 620(e) of the aid legislation—the Hickenlooper amendment—provides that the President shall suspend assistance to any nation which expropriates or takes measures equivalent to expropriating the property of U.S. citizens without taking appropriate steps to discharge its obligations under international law including speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value of the expropriated property or properties. The charter and bylaws of the IDB do not contain comparable safeguards against expropriation.

Though it is true that the United States at present has 42 percent of the vote and can veto any loan since all loans require a two-thirds approving vote, this committee may wish to direct the U.S. representatives to the IDB to veto any loans to countries against which the Hickenlooper amendment has been invoked so long as the suspension of aid to those countries continues.

VIETNAM POLICY

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe I speak the views of the overwhelming majority of Senators on this side of the aisle when I say that we applaud the attitude of the President of the United States in taking a firm position in regard to American foreign policy in South Vietnam. We have an agreement signed at Geneva by which we propose to abide. We continue to propose to abide by this agreement provided the other parties abide by it. We are in South Vietnam at the invitation of its government to help oppose aggression by North Vietnam Communists in violation of their agreement.

So long as the Communists insist on attacking, by infiltration, subversion, and aggression, in an attempt to destroy countries friendly to us, this Government is committed to lending aid and support to the victims. This Nation proposes to live up to its commitments. When the Communists strike our forces in a place where we have a right to be, we propose to strike back harder than they did. If a second power gets into it, we propose to strike that second power even harder. If a third power gets into it, we propose to strike that power harder. In each case we propose to strike the opposition with greater force than they strike against us, so long as they do not abide by the agreement. We would rather have them abide by the agreement, permitting us to abide by it, too.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article by Roscoe Drummond expressing his views on this subject.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM POLICY: THE MISSING INGREDIENT

(By Roscoe Drummond)

There is a missing ingredient in American policy in Vietnam.

From everything which has been said—and left unsaid—by the White House, the evidence is that President Johnson:

Intends to step up the retaliation enough to persuade North Vietnam that the aggression will be too costly to continue.

Wants to avoid intensifying it to the degree that it will lead to all-out war.

In a word, if I read correctly Mr. Johnson's words and actions, they mean that the United States aims to expand the war for a limited purpose and to avoid expanding the war beyond that purpose.

The purpose: To bring North Vietnam to accept a settlement that would insure the independence of South Vietnam, to which Hanoi pledged itself in 1954 and again in 1962.

Has this riskful and delicate operation got any fair chance of success?

It may have, but only if the missing ingredient is forthcoming at the right time.

The missing ingredient, which, it seems to me, must accompany new air thrusts against North Vietnam, is a major U.S. peace offensive, to make it clear that we seek only an end to the aggression, that we have no desire to inflict unnecessary blows, that our sole objective is a settlement mutually tolerable to both sides—whenever Hanoi will cease and desist.

I am not talking about an appeasement peace. There is no reason to believe the White House has any such thing in mind. But I am suggesting that, if the Johnson aim of a controlled expansion of the fighting as an essential persuader to Hanoi is to succeed, there must simultaneously be a peace offensive to convince Hanoi that it has a reasonable, acceptable alternative to all-out war.

More military action by itself could well bring unlimited expansion of the war.

A peace offensive by itself could only bring an intolerable appeasement.

Together they make sense—and could make headway toward the President's goal.

It is not likely that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong would be persuaded by either war action or peace action alone. The reason is that Hanoi and Peiping have long been convinced that the United States would not have the will and the patience to hang on, that the South Vietnamese Government was getting weaker, and that it would be foolish—for them—to give away at the conference table what they felt sure they were winning on the battlefield.

No wonder Ho Chi Minh has shown no interest in negotiation. For months we have talked stronger than we have acted. We have warned—and done little. We have conferred with ourselves—and done little. Now we are beginning to act more meaningfully.

But to bring North Vietnam to the conference table will take more than the few retaliations we have lately made. It will undoubtedly take persistent and heavy military pressure from the air and naval resources we have mobilized in the area. If Ho Chi Minh is to be persuaded to accept anybody's invitation to the conference table, it will have to be made clear that the only practical choice is between ending the war or suffering widespread devastation.

It is profoundly riskful to think we can expand the war in Vietnam and control its expansion at the same time. We must do it with our eyes open.

The only way this can be done with the least risk is to mount a peace offensive which would make our purpose clear and credible to allies and enemies alike.

My assumption is that such plans are well advanced within the Johnson administration and that the President is waiting for the proper time.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, while I am on this subject, let me say as a Democrat that I find tremendous cause to be grateful to Members on the other side of the aisle that the joint Senate-House Republican leadership issued a statement strongly supporting the President in this Nation's Vietnam policy. The Nation should be grateful for the bipartisan support given to the President's policy. I congratulate the Republican Senate leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], and other members of the Republican leadership in the Senate, as well as the Republican leadership in the House, for the magnificent statement issued today supporting the President's position in South Vietnam. Inasmuch as this statement has already been released to the Nation through the press, I shall not read it, but I ask unanimous consent to have it printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP

It is undoubtedly difficult for the Communist capitals of Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi—where disagreement is not tolerated—to understand that because Americans may differ on means to assure the complete independence of South Vietnam, there is no difference among us on the objective.

We, the members of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, want to make it clear we support President Johnson's recent order for strikes against Communist supply bases in North Vietnam. If we have any difference with the President in this respect, it is the belief these measures might have been used more frequently since the Bay of Tonkin decision last August and an even stronger policy formulated in the meantime.

These Communist-proclaimed "wars of liberation" are nothing more than a verbal cover for naked aggression. The Communists unmask this aggression when they "stage" mob demonstrations against American embassies as free world resistance to their terrorist tactics in an independent nation is stepped up.

We suggest that so long as there is Communist-promoted infiltration of South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements, there can be no negotiations on the Vietnamese question, and we urge the President to make this unmistakably clear to the world. Agreements can only fail when the Communists negotiate only for domination and we negotiate only for peace.

VIETNAM POLICY

Mr. MONRONEY. I have made it clear over the past few weeks that I am opposed to any withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. During a visit to that embattled country in December, I saw first hand the fine work that U.S.

fighting men are doing there to help the South Vietnamese people remain free of Communist domination. Our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors, and our civilian groups assigned this most difficult task are making a contribution to the cause of freedom equal to any other challenge that U.S. citizens have had to face in this century. It is a most complex and changeable situation. It defies simple explanation or simple solutions. Our patience and our fortitude are being put to a tough test.

Here at home, in recent weeks, a chorus of discouraging voices has been heard. One or two Members of the Senate have urged that we retreat in South Vietnam, and one or two others have called for a reduction in our national commitment in that part of the world. Those who have been singing these sad and discouraging songs have become victims, in my opinion, of headline writers who habitually make bad news the big news. Unfortunately, there have been defeats and setbacks in South Vietnam in recent weeks. But there have also been victories and gains by our side. These have been overlooked or ignored by too many people.

One of the biggest gains which we have made in recent weeks has been a gain in understanding on the part of the American people. I believe the people are awakening to the hard facts, and are beginning to see the South Vietnam struggle in terms of the cold war; for indeed it is now the principal battlefront of the cold war. Freedom everywhere, for that matter, is at stake. We should not make the error of downgrading the importance of our posture in South Vietnam.

I have been pleased to find more and more people willing to support our position. This means more and more people are realizing the nature of this unusual war. This escalation of understanding is a most hopeful sign.

The Sunday Star, published here in Washington, gave evidence of such understanding by publishing an editorial opposing what it termed "the counsels of timidity." This editorial deserves our attention and emphasis, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRUCE IN VIETNAM?

It has been almost 15 years since President Harry Truman took the bull by the horns and decided to fight back when the North Koreans launched their aggressive war. We eventually clobbered the North Koreans. Then the Communist Chinese "volunteers" came forth in massive numbers. After first being forced to retreat, we clobbered them, too, despite the "privileged sanctuary" which they were permitted to enjoy across the Yalu River.

At that point there came the appeal through the United Nations for a cease-fire and peace talks, to which we agreed. But there still is no peace, and, after 15 long years, we now have at least two divisions of American troops stationed on the firing line in Korea.

It is this experience with the "peaceful aims" of communism which makes us wonder a bit about the recent flurry of appeals for an end to the fighting and a revival of talk in southeast Asia.

The most important proposal has come from U Thant, United Nations chief executive. He urges an immediate end to American bombings in North Vietnam and of Communist operations which brought about the bombing raids. Thant thinks this should be followed by a conference looking toward a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese war. More or less similar suggestions have come from France and India.

As straws in the wind, even though they may be very small straws in a very strong wind, all of these deserve, and doubtless will receive, careful consideration. It is to be hoped, however, that the counsel of timidity, which prevailed in Korea, will not now be permitted to shape the course of events in Vietnam. And we say this in the belief that the decisive, clear-cut victory which probably could have been won in Korea may not be possible in Vietnam.

The point, or the question, really has to do with the intentions of the Communists. Do they want a settlement which would bring an end to Communist aggression? Or would they settle only for renewed negotiations which actually would cloak their long-range aggressive ambitions? If the latter, it seems to us that the United States should stay in there and, as the occasion may demand, hit back harder and harder and harder.

SERMON BY THE VERY REVEREND FRANCIS B. SAYRE, JR.

Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, on last Sunday, the straight-thinking, straight-speaking dean of the Washington Cathedral, the Very Reverend Francis B. Sayre, Jr., preached a sermon which brought the fighting in Vietnam out of the jungles into a frame where we at home can take a clear look at it.

He used a text from II Timothy, chapter 2, verses 9 and 10:

The word of God is not bound. Therefore, I suffer all things.

He also reminded us of President Lincoln's words: "God has his own purposes," when the moral turmoil of the Civil War afflicted both sides.

Dean Sayre, by the power of his words, identifies the fight for freedom in Vietnam today with the freedom of the human race, and calls it "the momentary focal point of a titanic struggle to determine in the valley of earth whether man can fulfill the image that God has imprinted upon his brow, or whether he must forever remain under the bondage of blindness and human chicanery."

I believe that the dean's words have especial meaning for us all as we deal with our frustrations and look for moral landmarks that are, as the dean puts it, "shrouded in a dark mist." I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD Dean Sayre's sermon of February 14 at Washington Cathedral.

There being no objection, the sermon was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SERMON PREACHED IN WASHINGTON CATHEDRAL BY THE VERY REVEREND FRANCIS B. SAYRE, JR., DEAN, FEBRUARY 14, 1965

From II Timothy 2: 9–10: "The word of God is not bound. Therefore I suffer all things."

All over America this week, wounded soldiers were arriving from Vietnam, entering hospitals near their homes, each one punctuating the scream of headlines with the immediacy of the war in Asia to families like yours and mine. Right past this cathedral rolls the ambulance that carries the lad with two broken ankles suffered when his helicopter was shot down north of Saigon, or the sergeant who was crushed when his barracks were blown up at Quinhon. This is hard for people—not because the suffering of a soldier is any more vivid just because he is close, but because with his return, the distant conflict is suddenly turned into flesh and blood; put into a dimension we can understand; brought close to every man's conscience.

So each wounded man lays upon every one of his countrymen involvement, but also frustration—frustration because this brutal war is so confused, and we are uncertain as to why we're fighting it; frustration, too, because individually we feel so helpless. The bell is tolling in the jungles far away. We know it is for us it tolls, but we don't know what we can do about it. Just now in the presence of life and death the moral landmarks are shrouded in a dark mist, and hence we know not how to be brave.

So has it always been in time of war, not so much for the men who fight as for those at home who are condemned to think and wait and find the grace to pray.

Think of the Civil War as it rent our Nation, the moral turmoil afflicting both sides. Shall freedom be based upon a continent or else upon the untrammeled rights of one section or another? What becomes of sacredness in the holy crusade against slavery when brother must murder brother or fall himself to the blood-stained earth? How infinitely hard it was then to know the right, even when virtually every family under both flags was intimately caught in the anguish.

What Lincoln saw in that war may help us to discern the meaning of this one, for surely in all our history there was never a servant as nearly hewn from the hard timber of God. In the solitude of his dread burden he yet perceived the silent accompaniment of the Divine. Humbly he strained to discern the holy shape of destiny. And as simply he caught the light in the clear prism of his life and speech. Though he never quoted them, I'm sure that Lincoln must have honored those words of St. Paul which were read in this morning's lesson, that "the word of God is not bound." For if ever there could be a seal of authenticity upon an apostle or a President or on a plain believer, it is in the profound humility of those words. God is not bound, neither by what you think nor what I think nor by the righteousness of any human cause. "This is the Gospel that I preach," cried St. Paul "nevertheless God is not bound. His love and grace quite transcend anything that I can conceive."

Lincoln knew that, too. "God," he said, "has His own purposes." He saw the Civil War first of all as God's judgment upon a nation by whom had come the offense of slavery. "Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's 250 years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 3,000 years ago, so still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether'."

When today the wounded come trailing home from Vietnam, and images of torture and death sully the innocent eyes of children in the pages of our news magazines, it is natural that we should recoil, right to pray that such wanton evil be soon suppressed, and by no means extended to ever wider arenas of combat. Yet if this pain but illustrates the judgment of God upon a wayward world ever persisting in its willful division, then must we accept the overrule of Providence, which is not bound by what we call right or wrong, but ordains agony until man-